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Unless otherwise indicated, these materials are full translations of articles appearing in People's Republic of China periodicals.

CORRECTION

The Chinese characters 史字文 , name of the author of "Refute the Fabricators of Lies" in SPRCM No. 805, p. 1, should read 史字新 ; the English romanization remains unchanged. The editor regrets this slip of the pen.

The True Features of Sung Philosopher Chu Hsi

by

Wen Chieh (文捷)
Cultural Post, Wuyuan Hsien, Kiangsi Province

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an /Study and Criticism/, No. 12, December 14, 1974)

Chu Hsi (朱熹 1130-1200 A.D.), a native of Wuyuan, was a Southern Sung philosopher. Swindlers like Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao have all invoked the departed spirit of Chu Hsi in the service of restoring capitalism. Lin Piao once said flippantly, "We should treat people like Chu Hsi did."

What kind of person after all was Chu Hsi? He was a ----

Sinister and Vicious Apologist

The appearance of Chu Hsi on the historical stage of the Southern Sung period as an apologist of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius was an inevitable product of the decline of feudal society. The philosophy of Chu Hsi is based on Confucian teachings, contrived of materials or trash salvaged from Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist doctrines and infused throughout with the spirit of the idealist school of principle or reason [the orthodox school of ethics as taught by the Sung philosophers], a new synthesis providing landlord class dictatorship in the latter part of feudal society with an ideological weapon.

Chu Hsi, a stubborn defender of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, built his theoretical basis through his commentaries on the "Four Books," his central doctrine embracing what he called "preserve Heavenly principle and extinguish human desire."* (Chu-tzu Yü-lei or Classified Conversations of Chu Hsi, Vol. 12) (Hereafter referred to as Conversations) Unlike other leading Confucianists who lacked conviction in their philosophical exposition of Confucian teachings, Chu Hsi borrowed extensively

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* Translator's Note: Chu Hsi built his doctrine most closely upon Ch'eng I's philosophy which constitutes the essence of the Ch'eng-Chu school of principle or reason (程朱理学), a philosophy which reasserts in an even more far-reaching manner what Confucius and his followers had always taught -- that man's sense of order and value does not alienate him from the universe but is precisely what unites him to it. In the sense that man derives his nature from the principle, that is, the "Heavenly principle," Chu Hsi's argument accepts that since the principle with which men are endowed is ever the same, it follows that their "nature alone remains constant."

from mystic Buddhist preachings and absurd Taoist theories. He also combined his philosophical interpretations with such Confucian sayings as "man's affinity with Heaven" and the "divine right of kings," describing principle (li) as an enduring embodiment of the universe. What he termed "Heavenly principle" and "human desire" was developed from Confucius' "restraining oneself and returning to propriety." Borrowing from the Taoist lexicon, he strained the feudal moral virtues like "benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and truthfulness" to mean that they embodied the Five Elements (metal, wood, water, fire and earth). He thus arbitrarily identified the ethical nature of the feudal landlord class as the nature of all things and all men in the universe. In a threatening tone, Chu Hsi said: "The bonds and virtues must never be extinguished for millennia." (Conversations, Vol. 24) Anything in contravention of the "three bonds and five constant virtues" -- ranging from revolutions and revolts to everyday trivia -- must be strictly banned.

To affirm his reactionary views on principle and desire, Chu Hsi developed what he termed the "nature of Heaven sustaining things" and the "nature of the ether or material-force (ch'i)."* He declared that "those who have received what is pure and exalted will be ennobled, those who have inherited what is bountiful will become wealthy, and those who have given rein to passion are to be deluded; and to be deluded is to be ignorant, improper, debased and to perish." (Conversations, Vol. 4) He thus described the political representatives of the landlord class as born rulers preordained by Heaven and identified the broad masses of the people as those who were only fit to be enslaved and governed by others. His interpretation of this was reinforced by his reactionary belief in the landlord class' idealist self-cultivation to bring one's conduct into conformity with the principles of /Confucian Classics/ which should govern it. Eventually, Chu Hsi asserted, persistent effort through the exercise of "earnestness" (苟文) in this direction would result in everything's becoming suddenly clear and the full enlightenment of the "sage being attained." (Conversations, Vol. 12) To be able to attain this, he claimed, one should pursue the "investigation of things" (ko wu 格物) and advancement of learning underlying the extension of knowledge. With this earnestness and sincerity of purpose, according to Chu Hsi, we can ward off evil and finally attain tranquillity within the empire. It is this conviction in "earnestness" and spiritual cultivation that made Chu Hsi adhere to the Buddhist interpretation of emptiness, such as "sitting

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* Translator's Note: Chu Hsi's metaphysical system is primarily based upon Chang Tsai's theory of the ether or ch'i (气). He defined hsing (性) or nature as an immaterial and immutable principle inhering in all things, which gives them their form and constitutes their essence. This principle, as Chu Hsi interpreted it, is his true nature, fundamentally good. Man's mind, according to Chu Hsi's reasoning, is in essence one with the mind of the universe, capable of entering into all things and understanding their principles.

like a corpse, standing according to the rules of propriety" and "holding the head erect and staring straight." (Conversations, Vol. 12) Until this "earnestness" was exercised and spiritual cultivation of "affairs" such as those concerning the feudal institution, the feudal emperors and feudal moral discipline was duly practiced, the "ordering of the state" and "tranquillity within the empire" could hardly be attained. Chu Hsi thus used this highly abstract system to paint an illusory picture of absurdity and cheap lies to confound the public. He did so to whitewash the utterly decadent and reactionary feudal rule so as to benumb the fighting will of the working people and hamper their revolutionary spirit.

Behind the man-killing doctrine of "preserving Heavenly principle and extinguishing human desire," the exponents of the school of reason exemplified by Chu Hsi were in fact a group of hangmen who put people to death without blinking. In his memorial to the emperor during the reign of Hsiao-tsung, Chu Hsi advocated the institution of harsh punishments to bring the recalcitrant people under control. To uphold the interests of the feudal ruling classes, he adamantly called for unrelenting handling of cases involving insubordination or disrespect to one's superior. In a word, he would not tolerate anything like revolution or rebellion. Before he was officially assigned to Hunan, a peasant uprising had just occurred. Upon assuming office he hastily called a meeting of his henchmen to devise alternately soft and hard measures to put down the peasant revolt. When Ning-tsung ascended the throne an imperial amnesty was proclaimed. But Chu Hsi did not make public the amnesty edict until he had "executed 18 arch convicts." This duplicity amply revealed the pretense and his cruel nature.

Crafty and Artful Conspirator

In his letter replying to Ch'en Ch'i-chung, Chu Hsi mentioned the "extension of knowledge lies in the investigation of things." He meant that we should apply ourselves to things so as to gain an exhaustive knowledge of their principle. But Chu Hsi's interpretation could also mean being "versed in the affairs of the world" -- implying that one should sum up and apply the stratagems and tricks employed by all reactionaries in history to realize his secret motives.

By gathering his disciples and giving them instructions, Chu Hsi covered up his dirty activity of forming factions for selfish ends. When he was an official in Tungan hsien, Fukien, he spared no efforts to recruit pupils for a school he had set up -- his first base for fostering a group of followers. As he was brought up and active in Fukien for a long time, his numerous disciples there thus became the backbone of the "Fukien school" of 16 hardcore elements, including his son-in-law Huang Kan. With Fukien as the base, it did not take Chu Hsi long to extend his sphere of influence to Kiangsi, Anhwei, Chekiang and Hunan. Big and small "schools" set up by him in these provinces became the grassroots organizations for training his followers into aherents of his rationalistic philosophy. His disciples were even employed by high officials of the central administration in the

Southern Sung capital Linan (Hangchow). Chang Ching-fu, one of his close friends, was Hsiao-tsung's teacher. Chu Hsi once said boastfully, "If I don't receive visitors on a certain day I would be taken ill for a month. After talking to visitors today, for instance, I feel much at ease." (Conversations, Vol. 107) His apparent "hospitality," however, was belied by the fact that most of what he called "guests" were none other than his close followers from various places. They were his trusted adherents. They called on him to pass on information, helped him devise ways and means and spread his doctrine far and wide through indirect and obscure channels. In his Conversations and correspondence, Chu Hsi used the words ch'i-hsiang (氣象) to mean the circumstances which were then prevailing. By studying the circumstances and discussing stratagems about moves for advance or retreat, he could attain the objective of "controlling the affairs of the empire." (Conversations, Vol. 107)

A brazen politician given to courting favor by servile flattery, Chu Hsi associated himself with a handful of bureaucrats and politicians, including four prime Ministers and 13 senior officials. Some were his devoted followers; others were trumpeters of his rationalistic philosophy. Apart from his customary approach such as penning verses and producing elegant handwriting as well as giving away gifts, he would try to win over followers by recommending them for official appointments. When asked by one of his disciples about Yen Hui's prospect in the event Confucius was offered office, Chu Hsi replied: "If Confucius became prime minister Yen Hui would be his deputy." (Conversations, Vol. 26) This conversation illustrated the motivation behind his attempt at forming factions. He repeatedly urged his followers to take military action once they were in power, as recorded in Conversations. To realize his wild ambitions to usurp power, he brazenly embellished himself as a "genius." In a poem dedicated to his mother on her birthday, he ascribed his "highborn" status to the good deeds of his ancestors and his wisdom to his mother. According to the Wuyuan Hsien Register, the followers of Chu Hsi, born in Yuchi, Fukien, fabricated the myth that at the time of his birth in Wuyuan "a violet-colored and rainbow-like vapor was seen emitting from a well."

Sung philosopher Chu Hsi exemplified duplicity in that he was well versed in deception. As duly recorded in Conversations, he advised people not to be consistent in words and deeds, even urging them to be ambitious and to plan and scheme without being too anxious to obtain immediate results. He also stressed the importance of observing the outward manifestations of a person's intentions from his countenance. In Conversations, Chu Hsi cited an instance to illustrate an artful design intended to accomplish something. He used this instance about taking a dish of delicacies to underline the importance of stratagem for gaining an end, whether in taking more of the table delicacies or grabbing power faster than the others. This was just one instance illustrating Chu Hsi's obsession with machination practiced by Sung philosophers.

Chu Hsi's anti-Buddhist posture made him denounce the Buddhist doctrine as something he likened to "a broken urn." (Conversations, Vol. 126) Hardly had he finished with this abuse when he borrowed freely

from Buddhist views to reinforce his rationalistic philosophy. Clearly an arch usurper, he would often pretend to decline official appointments more than once before accepting office. By doing so he enhanced his position and raised his official status. An utterly greedy and corrupt official blinded by personal gain, he would denounce those who had accepted bribes. When he was calling for "uprightness and sincerity," he was robbing other people's land, digging up their ancestral graves, keeping nuns and concealing the misdeeds perpetrated by his disciples. He in fact did as he pleased and stopped at nothing.

Chu Hsi's duplicity and his artful designs were not unknown to the public. At the time some people had perceived that he "has deceived the world and gained reputation to which he is not entitled, and should not be trusted." (Sung History, Ch'eng Ping) He was even denounced by Fu Po-shou, his disciple. After unmasking Chu Hsi, Ming Legalist Li Chih said abusively: "What a Sung philosopher, with the skin of his face three inches thick!" (Shih-shuo Hsien-yü Pu) To a certain extent they had laid bare this conspirator's features.

Capitulationist Who Brought Misfortune to the State and Its People

Following the establishment of the Southern Sung Dynasty every year the rulers paid tribute amounting to 250,000 taels of silver and 250,000 bolts of silk to the Chin tribal aggressors in the north in exchange for temporary and uneasy peace. Armed peasants who were active in regions north and south of the Yangtse River at the time continuously struck blows at the aggressors and the bogus troops collaborating with the Chin tribe. The vast numbers of the working people likewise longed for recovery of the lost land. Chu Hsi, however, closely associated himself with the capitulationist line and was engaged in spreading reactionary propaganda and in activities identified with national betrayal.

Harboring ulterior motives, Chu Hsi and his band propagated capitulationism in the name of upholding the Mean (中庸). In his annotations to the Mean, he cited "impartiality" to cover up the essence of a policy of capitulation as embodied in the saying that "peace is to be prized." He called for emulating the deportment of a "gentleman" and "elder" in the face of "perversities which should be accepted without recourse to counter-measures" at a time when the Chin tribe of the north was occupying the Central Plain and carrying out acts of aggression like burning, killing and looting. He even praised the traitor Ch'in K'uai for being a "person of rectitude." He was often seen in the company of his disciples wandering in the mountains and lingering around the rivers to propagate the doctrine of "preserving Heavenly principle and extinguishing human desire," instead of calling upon the people to resist aggression. Small wonder Yen Yuan, a Ch'ing materialist thinker, said angrily: This is an attempt to "turn the empire .... into a multitude of weak, sick, and useless people." (Comment on Rationalistic Nature, Chapter on Preservation of Learning)

Chu Hsi's pacifist utterances were invariably refuted by the belligerent group, whose exponent, Ch'en Liang, had on numerous occasions argued with Chu Hsi, particularly the latter's philosophy of capitulation. This enraged Chu Hsi, who incited his followers to slander and strike blows at Ch'en Liang through various means at their disposal, accusing the latter of harboring improper motives. Finally, Chu Hsi had to go into close combat. Ranting before Hsiao-tsung, he accused Ch'en Liang of harboring "base views" and attacked him for "robbing Your Majesty's wealth" and "usurping Your Majesty's power." (Sung History, Chu Hsi) He took advantage of his power and influence to devise every possible means to strike blows at Ch'en Liang and his patriotic followers. Consequently, Ch'en Liang was thrice arrested and imprisoned. He almost lost his life.

While the Chu-tzu Wen-chi* abounds in references to "resistance to the enemy," once the hypocrite who "wept with feeling upon finding that the state was on the decline" was asked to fight the adversary on the battleground, he would immediately change his tune. In the Chu-tzu Wen-chi, he is recorded as saying: "What chance is there to recover the paltry southeast?" Engels said, "Mean tricks justify mean aims." What Chu Hsi was after was no better than a lulling sense of temporary and uneasy peace, compromise, surrender. He is also recorded in the Chu-tzu Wen-chi and Letter to Lu Po-kung as having said: "I have only wished to leave this minor piece of writing to later generations as a small rectification between Heaven and Earth." Which dynasty was he referring to by what he called the "later generations"? Could this be taken to mean fawning upon the Chin tribal aggressors and becoming a puppet emperor? It turned out to be exactly so. For during the reign of Kuang-tsung, a Sung emissary returning to court from the north brought back word from the Chin emperor inquiring about Chu Hsi's whereabouts and his health and office. (Wuyuan Hsien Register) By naming Chu Hsi and expressing concern for his condition, the latter's capitulationist utterances and deeds were thus in full accord with the aggressive design of the Chin tribe. Facts serve as a mirror. After the collapse of the Southern Sung large numbers of the adherents of the school of reason joined the fold of the Yuan empire, abandoning their black cotton hats and donning the scarlet "kuku" headgear of the Yuan imperial court. The Sung History, edited by the Yuan prime minister and compiled with the assistance of Southern Sung philosophers, contains a special section describing the "treacherous ministers" who revered the teachings handed down by Confucius -- an astonishing mockery of Chu Hsi's rationalistic philosophy of "spiritual cultivation, regulation of family affairs, the ordering of the state, and tranquillity within the empire."

Chairman Mao has said, "Whoever belittles the role of teaching by negative example is not a thorough dialectical materialist." Chu Hsi served as a teacher by giving a negative example. Repudiating him therefore will be helpful to our further understanding of Lin Piao's sinister motive behind his extolling of Chu Hsi and recognition of the identical approach employed by all double-dealers.

* * *

* "A Collection of Chu Tzu's Writings"

Beginning with Hsiang Yü's Policy of Killing the Surrendered

by

Hsü Kuo-fen (徐国芬)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an [Study and Criticism], No. 12, December 14, 1974)

Hsiang Yü was a man who did not talk about policy and always killed those who surrendered to him. In 206 B.C., under his command the Ch'u army routed the Ch'in army in Chülu, Changshui, and Wushui. The Ch'en general Chang Han surrendered to Ch'u with his 200,000 men. Fearing that the Ch'in troops might stage a revolt when they were brought to Kuanchung, Hsiang Yü decided to strike first. Suddenly in one night he had all the 200,000 Ch'in troops buried alive in the south of Hsin-an city. There were other similar incidents perpetrated by Hsiang Yü. For instance, when he attacked the Hsiang city, all men and women, young and old in that city were buried alive; when he entered Hsienyang, the city was razed to the ground. In short, wherever Hsiang's army passed, it left behind scorched earth and corpses all over the fields.

Hsiang Yü's policy of killing the surrendered gave expression to the class reprisals and death-bed struggle frantically carried out by the declining slave-owning class. But it was precisely this reactionary policy that brought about Hsiang Yü's total defeat in the contention between Ch'u and Han. An analysis of the different attitudes adopted by the two political groups under Liu Pang and Hsiang Yü respectively toward captives may enable us to see the importance of policy to the success or failure of struggle.

In the Ch'u-Han contention, insofar as the two political groups under Liu Pang and Hsiang Yü respectively were concerned, "whoever has more reserve forces, more manpower and greater support among the masses of the people will win the victory in the war." However, to win the support of the masses of the people, apart from a correct ideological and political line, there must be a correct policy. Hsiang Yü's policy of killing the surrendered was wrong because it brought about the evil consequence of losing the support of the masses of the people. The bulk of the Ch'in troops who surrendered was made up of "children of the Ch'in people," "poor peasants" and "slaves." Some were children of the landlord class of the Ch'in empire, some were peasants who had gained their freedom, and some were slaves who were forcibly drafted into service by the Chao Kao restorationist regime. Therefore, they had close ties with the various strata of society, particularly with the people in Kuanchung. Although they had surrendered to the Ch'u army, they deeply feared that "the Ch'in court might order the execution of our parents, wives and children." They were in a dilemma. Therefore, how to deal with these men would affect not only the balance of military strength but also the support of the people.

When Hsiang Yü killed the 200,000 Ch'in troops, only three generals including Chang Han escaped. "The people of Ch'in blamed these three men for this bloody tragedy." Coupled with this, the massacre of Hsienyang, "the killing of Tzu Ying and families of the princes of Ch'in," "the burning of their houses, the capture of their children, and confiscation of their valuable property" directly aroused the panic and hatred of the Ch'in people, with the result that every family in Kuanchung bore a great grudge against Hsiang Yü. Thus, Hsiang Yü's killing of the surrendered might seem on the surface to be aimed at wiping out the enemy's effective strength; actually, it caused "the world to hate him and the common people not to support him." As a result, Hsiang Yü found it impossible to establish his foothold in the Kuanchung area and had to return east to P'engch'eng. During the Ch'u-Han war, Hsiang Yü always found himself fighting alone, relying on only 8,000 men of Chiangtung, and always found his men exhausted and short of food. Therefore, Hsiang Yü's policy of killing the surrendered "actually caused the loss of the support of the people, although it was described as aiming at establishing hegemony." It was a policy that courted self-destruction.

In striking contrast with Hsiang Yü's brutal policy of killing the surrendered, Liu Pang, proceeding from the long-range interest of the unification cause of the landlord class, adopted a more correct policy toward the officials and troops of the Ch'in court who surrendered to him. Not long after Liu Pang raised his army, he had Wanch'eng surrounded ring upon ring. The Ch'in governor was so anguished that he wanted to draw his sword and kill himself. Then a house guest called Ch'en Hui stopped him and said: "P'ei Kung [Liu Pang] is a kind-hearted man. We'd better open the gate and surrender." Moreover, he offered to go to see Liu Pang. As was expected, Liu Pang accepted his proposal and the surrender of the city. Moreover, he made the Ch'in governor marquis of Yin and still left him in charge of the city, while he himself advanced to the west with his men gathered at Wanch'eng. On the way, influenced by the Wanch'eng incident, many cities "open their gates and wait" for Liu Pang to arrive. This enabled Liu Pang to advance unimpeded. He quickly took Hanku Pass and marched into Hsienyang. After entering the capital city, Liu Pang not only refused to kill the Ch'in king, Tzu Ying, who had surrendered but also made a pact with the Ch'in people. He sealed off the state treasury and closed the palaces. He sentenced murderers to death and punished those who injured others. He protected the inhabitants against "violence." During his expedition in the east, Liu Pang again clearly provided that "if a Ch'in governor of a prefecture surrenders, he will be given ten thousand households." This series of correct policies in dealing with all kinds of people in the enemy camp caused the balance of military strength and moral support to shift in favor of Liu Pang, forcefully promoting the division and disintegration of the enemy and isolating a small handful of reactionaries under Hsiang Yü. When Liu Pang's large army entered Hsienyang, the people of Kuanchung danced with joy, "offering the soldiers cattle, sheep and wine" and "fearing only that P'ei Kung would not become the king of Ch'in."

Therefore, during the Ch'u-Han war which came later, Liu Pang was able to use the Kuanchung base as his strong rear shield for the supply of army provisions and replenishment of his troops with the support of the people of Kuanchung. Despite the fact that he suffered repeated defeats at the front, he was always able to turn the tide. In 205 B.C., Liu Pang lost the battle at Tsuishui. Almost the whole Han army was wiped out. Liu Pang broke out with merely scores of men. At this critical moment, under the leadership of Empress Lü and Hsiao Ho, the people of Sanch'in, ranging from old men in their sixties to boys in their teens, rushed to the front to reinforce Liu Pang's military strength, enabling him to raise his banner and possess a strong army again. Finally, with his army becoming stronger as fighting went on, he won the victory. The contention between Ch'u and Han ended with Liu's victory and Hsiang's defeat, and an extremely important factor was the popularity of Liu Pang's policy among the people. Therefore, a class or a political group, in order to win the victory in struggle, must have not only a correct line but also a correct policy.

A correct policy serves as an important guarantee for the implementation of the line. We often come across such cases in struggle: While the political line is correct, a wrong policy causes setbacks to the struggle and unnecessary loss to the revolution. Here, we may cite a case of killing the surrendered that went completely contrary to Hsiang Yü's line. In 260 B.C., the great general of the state of Ch'in, Pai Ch'i, had the 400,000 Chao troops surrounded in Ch'angp'ing. After being denied food for more than 40 days, the Chao troops could no longer resist the Ch'in army and surrendered. But Pai Ch'i, fearing "revolt by the Chao troops," gave the order for the execution of the 400,000 Chao troops, allowing only 240 young men to return to their land. This was the famous Ch'angp'ing battle in the Warring States period. Pai Ch'i's killing of the surrendered took place in the reign of King Chao of Ch'in, when the state of Ch'in, guided by a correct line, was carrying out a reform program of the landlord class to push the cause of unifying the six states. The Legalist Fan Tsui's diplomatic line of "making friends with distant states and attacking neighboring states" had brought continuous victories in the feudal war of unification. Therefore, Pai Ch'i's killing of the Chao troops was undoubtedly at that time a wrong action that went counter to the correct line and policy of the state of Ch'in. And it was this wrong action that caused temporary setbacks to the progress of unifying the whole country by Ch'in. After the battle of Ch'angp'ing, in the state of Chao "the dead were not buried, the injured were not treated; people wept together and united to resist the invaders." This caused defeat to the Ch'in army when it attacked the capital of Chao, Hantan. At the same time, "the people of Shangtang revolted and sided with Chao, and no people in the world were willing to be ruled by Ch'in." Lord Hsinling of the State of Wei went to rescue Chao and united the armies of the five states to bitterly trounce the Ch'in troops, driving them to the Tanku Pass. The people of Ch'in "fled to Yen in the north, Ch'i in the east, and Han and Wei in the south." These were the adverse political and military consequences brought about by the wrong policy

of killing the surrendered. The incident of killing the surrendered at Ch'angp'ing taught a profound lesson: The policy guarantees the line, and without a correct policy the execution of a correct line becomes an empty word.

Of course, the policy of a class or political group is in the last analysis determined by its line. After the Ch'angp'ing battle, the landlord class of Ch'in, headed by King Chao, drew on this profound lesson and quickly reversed the situation. When King Chao attacked Western Chou in the 51st year of his reign, the king of Western Chou surrendered to Ch'in, "offering the latter all 36 cities with a population of 30,000." King Chao adopted a correct policy in place of the wrong policy pursued by Pai Ch'i. As a result, "all the people of the world come to pay their tributes." A large number of Legalists arrived to offer their service. It was possible to unite with the overwhelming majority of people who were dedicated to the reform cause of the landlord class and to destroy the alliance of the six states. Finally, by the time of Ch'in Shih Huang the cause of unifying the six states was consummated. Hsiang Yü's policy of killing the surrendered was different in character from that of Pai Ch'i, in that it was determined by his erroneous line and class nature. Hsiang Yü came from the aristocracy in the state of Ch'u, and his ancestors had been "generals of Ch'u for generations." His grandfather Hsiang Yen was killed by Wang Chien, a big general in the time of Ch'in Shih Huang. Therefore, although Hsiang Yü took part in the peasant uprisings, actually he represented the interests of the declining slave-owning class and pushed a restorationist, regressive line both ideologically and politically. As no regressive act was supported by the people, he could only achieve his purpose of restoring the old order by violence, by "killing and burning ruthlessly." Hsiang Yü's policy of killing the surrendered was precisely a product of a defeated class which "struggles with effort increased tenfold, frantic enthusiasm and hatred increased a hundredfold, trying to restore the 'paradise' that had been taken away from them." However, anyone who attempts to stop the wheel of history by massacre can only be a mantis which tries to stop the chariot with its forelegs and end up in self-destruction. Hsiang Yü ended up by finding himself deserted by all and he had to kill himself by the side of the Wu River.

Hsiang Yü's fate was a common feature and inevitable result of all erroneous lines and policies carried out by all reactionary classes. But the policy of killing the surrendered and Hsiang Yü's defeat deserve to be studied by us. A silk scroll recently unearthed from Mawangtsui No. 3 has this to say: "Killing the people who follow you, butchering the surrendered, and punishing the guiltless are sure to lead to disastrous consequences." This means that it is necessary to handle correctly all kinds of contradictions or there would be adverse consequences. Today, for us to enforce Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, to unite with all forces that can be united with, and to win new victories, we must strictly distinguish between two kinds of contradictions and implement various proletarian policies. We

should unite with, not reject, those who have done something wrong but who genuinely express their willingness to correct their mistakes. Only by so doing can we isolate and hit at a handful of the most stubborn enemies and unite with over 95 percent of the people. This is a historical experience Hsiang Yü's policy of killing the surrendered has provided us by negative example.

* * *

On the Battle of Feishui

by

Li Hsing-pin (李兴斌)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an [Study and Criticism], No. 12, December 14, 1974)

The Battle of Feishui was a well-known battle. In this battle, Eastern Tsin with only 80,000 soldiers defeated the nearly one million troops of Fu Ch'in. This set a typical example of a **small** force defeating **a large force and of the weak defeating the strong in China's war history.** In his work "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," our great leader Chairman Mao, citing the Battle of Feishui and other battles as examples, explained the scientific military principle that a weak army can defeat a strong army under certain conditions. One of the important reasons why Eastern Tsin was able to defeat the superior army of Fu Ch'in was that Eastern Tsin attached more importance to internal unity and stability. The progress and outcome of the battle vividly prove that unity is strength and victory.

On the eve of the Battle of Feishui the political situation which prevailed in China was one of confrontation between the north and the south. The north was under the rule of the Early Ch'in Dynasty founded by **the Ti tribe; the south was under the rule of the Eastern Tsin** Dynasty--a partially acknowledged regime of the landlord class of the Han nationality.

Since the Han and Wei dynasties, large numbers of minority nationalities in the **western and northern frontiers moved into the northern parts of China. Among the principal nationalities were the Huns [Hsiungnu],** Hsienpei, Chieh, Ti and Chiang. The cruel economic exploitation and racial oppression by the Western Tsin rulers **led to resistance by the** people of various nationalities. **As the class and racial contradictions** continued to aggravate, the Hun troops stormed Loyang and captured Ssuma Chih, Emperor Huai of Tsin, in 311 A.D.; five years later, they took Changan, forcing Ssuma Yeh, the last emperor of the Western Tsin Dynasty, to surrender. With the end of this dynasty, years of war and turmoil plagued the north. Leaders of the minority nationalities began to expand their armed forces and assume independence one by one, forming scores of small and large states in the north, which were known in history as the '16 states of five barbarian tribes." Among the bigger states were the Later Chao of the Chieh tribe, the former Yen of the Hsienpei tribe, and the former Ch'in established by Fu Hung of the Ti tribe. Finally, the former Ch'in under the rule of Fu Chien unified the entire north after a succession of wars. Following the temporary unification of Northern China by the former Ch'in, internal contradictions still continued to exist.

In the society of the former Ch'in, the principal class and racial contradictions were between the ruling group of the Ti tribe and the people of conquered nationalities. While a small number of Ti tribal aristocrats became rulers sitting at the top, the vast masses of people of Han, Hsienpei and Chiang nationalities became the targets of exploitation and oppression. As the rulers of the former Ch'in initiated wars year after year, they had to conscript men and collect grain tax and other miscellaneous levies. This added to the hardships of the people. Besides the contradictions between the ruling tribe and the people of various nationalities, the contradictions between the ruling tribe and the remnant forces of the ruling classes of other conquered races were also fairly acute. For example, when the former Yen of the Hsienpei tribe was destroyed by the former Ch'in, the ruling Mujung clan was forced to surrender. Superficially, it feigned obedience, but in the dark it was always plotting a rebellion. But Fu Chien trusted Mujung Chui so much that he made him the mayor of the capital. Take another example. The leader of the Chiang tribe Yao Chang also feigned obedience while awaiting an opportunity to act. Besides, there were also contradictions within the ruling group of the Ti tribe marked by internal struggle for power and mutual deception. Fu Chien, a "Lunghsiang general," became the king of the state of Ch'in after killing Fu Sheng, son of Fu Kin. Not long after assuming power, he put his own brother Fu Fa to death. Fu Chien had a cousin named Fu Lo, who "was strong and brave and whose violent disposition was never surpassed by any one." (Fu Chien, Records of Former Ch'in) Because Fu Chien distrusted and was jealous of him, he sent Fu Lo to the frontier despite the latter's war exploits. This filled Fu Lo with hatred for his cousin. In the fifth year of King Fu Chien's Tayuan reign, Fu Lo led an army of 70,000 men to stage a revolt and attacked the capital Changan. Although Fu Chien was able to suppress the revolt, he was still apprehensive. Having learned a negative lesson, he sent all the young men of the Fu clan to the frontier by giving them domains to rule so as to prevent them from harassing the capital. Not long afterward, Fu Fa's descendants Fu Shuang, Fu Liu, Fu Shou and Fu Wu rose in rebellion one after another. A new wave of rebellion arose when the previous one had barely subsided. These complicated contradictions brought turbulence and unrest to the society of the former Ch'in, which indeed was like a live underground volcano. The political power of the state was therefore unstable, as it was built on the basis of piles upon piles of contradictions. As was pointed out in historical records, "Relying on its vast territory, Ch'in never ceased to make wars because it liked to win....its troops tracked thousands of miles and many died of hunger, the soldiers were tired, and the people in the rear areas suffered poverty. Therefore, its downfall was imminent." (Tzu Chih T'ung Chien, Vol. 104) In spite of the fact that the former Ch'in was facing the danger of collapse, Fu Chien, who over-estimated his own strength, launched a war against the Eastern Tsin in disregard for the serious crisis created by the social contradictions.

How were things going on in the Eastern Tsin that Fu Chien wanted to attack? Doubtless, there were many contradictions in Eastern Tsin society. These contradictions, viewed from the situation at that

time, included the contradictions between the landlord class and the peasantry in the Eastern Tsin period, the prominent contradictions between the Royal House and the official clans, the contradictions between the northern clans and the southern clans and the contradictions among the northern clans. But the power-holders of the Eastern Tsin were able to stabilize the regime for a time, because they adopted a series of measures to alleviate the contradictions. In areas where the influence of the southern clans was relatively weak, the rulers of Eastern Tsin set up certain special districts called Ch'iaochou, Chiaochun and Chiaohsien to accommodate the clans and the masses of people who had fled south from the north. As for army deserters and people who had lost their homes, Prime Minister Hsieh An also proposed to accommodate them, and was opposed to punishing them at will. To those who opposed his suggestion, Hsieh An persuaded them by saying: "One should treat others with high virtue and discard minor things; when bandits intrude into one's house, one should not aggravate the situation by acting recklessly." (Shih Shuo Hsin-yü) This lessened social unrest and strengthened social stability. Knowing that those people who had fled invariably had a longing for their homeland, the rulers of the Eastern Tsin raised the banner of "northern expedition" so as to give them the illusion of "fighting back to the homeland." This also played a part in reassuring the people. In the Eastern Tsin society the contradictions between the Royal House and the official clans were also quite acute. After the destruction of the Western Tsin, the heir-apparent Prince Ssuma Jui fled to the south. With the support of the Chungyüan clan headed by Wang Tao, he became the emperor of the Eastern Tsin (Emperor Yuan of Tsin). This brought about a complicated situation in the contradictions between the Royal House and the official clans. The Royal House sought to make use of the strength of the official clans, and the latter sought to make use of the Royal House's prestige. This was the aspect of mutual exploitation. The other aspect of the contradiction was that while the emperor was not willing to be a puppet, the official clans were not willing to hand over power which was already in their hands. The political situation became unstable when the contradiction was aggravated, but was fairly stable when it was alleviated. On the eve of the Battle of Feishui, the premiership was assumed by Hsieh An, a progressive statesman with great political foresight and rich administrative experience. While loyal in his service to the Royal House, he was able to handle the relatives of the wife of the emperor and made them cooperate with him. On one occasion, Wang Yun, the father-in-law of Emperor Hsiaowu of Tsin, lost his temper and refused to accept the post as military commander of Chingkou. Hsieh An patiently talked him into accepting it. (Wang Yun, History of Tsin) Hsieh An also adopted a series of measures to readjust the relations between the clans of north and south. In the earlier years of the Eastern Tsin, power was mainly in the hands of the northern clans, while the southern clans were excluded from the central authorities. When Hsieh An came to power, the Huan family of the southern clans had already taken part in the central military and political administration, and came into conflict with the Wang and Hsieh families of the northern clans. As prime minister, Hsieh An was at once good at

struggle and at promoting unity. At that time, as Emperor Hsiaowu of Tsin was still young, power was in the hands of War Minister Huan Wen, who had the army under his command. Consequently his relations with the royal court were strained. Even when Huan Wen was critically ill, he still ordered Yuan Hung to draft an imperial order conferring on him the top honors of the state in order to pave the way for seizing the throne. Hsieh An withheld the draft order, citing as a reason for withholding it the need to modify its wording. In this way he smashed Huan Wen's dream of becoming an emperor. However, Hsieh An also knew how to unite people. He had worked harmoniously for many years with General Huan Ch'ung, the younger brother of Huan Wen, and they formed a relatively stable leading nucleus. In the event of important decisions, Huan Ch'ung would first consult him before taking any action. Once, Huan Ch'ung was advised to kill Hsieh An at a time when the latter's popularity was on the rise. But Huan Ch'ung not only refused to do so but voluntarily turned over the power of governor of Yangchou to Hsieh An in addition to other jobs. After making this decision, Huan Ch'ung never changed his mind even in the face of continuing opposition from his family. This was inseparable from Hsieh An's initiative to work on many quarters. When he was in power, he also concerned himself with restraining his own family members and relatives, having no desire to practice favoritism. After General Huan Ch'ung died, the vacated posts of governors of Chingchou and Chiangchou, two strategic cities of the Eastern Tsin Dynasty, should, in terms of prestige, have been filled by Hsieh Hsüan, nephew of Hsieh An. To avoid suspicion, he appointed Huan Shih-min, Huan I and Huan Shih-chien, members of the southern clans, to the governorships of Chingchou, Chiangchou and Yuchou respectively. With "three Huans governing three chous," political harmony was attained. In addition, Hsieh An also properly handled the contradiction among the northern clans within the ruling group of the Eastern Tsin. There were a hundred families of the big official clans which fled to the south from the north. They were divided into many grades on the basis of their status and by the order of their crossing the river to the south. The two most influential families among them were the Wang and Hsieh families. Wang Tao was one of the "founders" of the Eastern Tsin and its first prime minister. Basically, all high-ranking government positions were held by the Wang family, and for this reason, a sharp contradiction existed between it and the Hsieh family. This contradiction was not eased until Hsieh An and Wang Tan-chih together served Emperor Hsiaowu. According to historical records, the two got along nicely. "Hsieh An and Wang Tan-chih served loyally as assistants to the emperor and eventually achieved reconciliation." "After Wang Tan-chih became governor of Hsuchou and secretary general of Chaoan, Hsieh An did everything to assist him..... He [Hsieh] worked in harmony with others, and was a considerate and thoughtful person. His virtuous rule prevailed everywhere. In this way, both the civil service and military officers became dedicated to the cardinal national programs in disregard of minor personal disputes. Eventually, Hsieh An became known far beyond the national boundary. Everyone compared him favorably to Wang Tao, while describing his intellectual achievements as being surpassed by none." (Hsieh An, History of Tsin) Because Hsieh An and others paid attention to unity

and made proper efforts to adjust internal relations, the government of the Eastern Tsin became relatively consolidated. Against this social background, the Eastern Tsin Dynasty could have little worry about its rear in war against the former Ch'in, and was to a certain extent superior to the latter politically.

The ruling groups of the former Ch'in and the Eastern Tsin followed different approaches in handling their respective social contradictions. As a result, the former faced increasing turmoil while the latter gradually achieved stability. When we make a specific analysis of the preparations made by both sides for the Battle of Feishui as well as the entire course of the battle, we will see that political differences within the ruling group of the former Ch'in, lack of popular support and an unstable rear had led to defeat and that unity to deal with the enemy and a stable rear had enabled Eastern Tsin to emerge the victor.

Fu Chien had contemplated an attack against the Eastern Tsin Dynasty for some time. However, the inner ruling clique of the former Ch'in was generally opposed to Fu Chien's decision to launch an all-out attack against the Eastern Tsin Dynasty. This widened its internal split. In the winter of 382 A.D., Fu Chien called his court into session. At this session, he discussed his plan to attack the Eastern Tsin Dynasty with the entire court including civilian and military officials. Fu Chien asked: I have an army of 970,000 men. What do you think if I personally lead it to destroy the Eastern Tsin? Everyone disagreed with Fu Chien's plan except one person, Chu T'ung, the court secretary general who was a yes-man to the emperor. Finding that no one supported him, Fu Chien dismissed the meeting. He asked only his younger brother, Fu Jung, to stay so they could discuss the plan further. But Fu Jung was also firmly opposed to the idea, something beyond Fu Chien's expectations. Furious, Fu Chien said: If you do not support me, whom can I count on? Fu Chien's Crown Prince Fu Hung and his favorite and youngest son Fu Shen also came to dissuade him from attacking Tsin. But Fu Chien said to them: This is an important question, it has nothing to do with you kids. Lady Chang, Fu Chien's beloved concubine, also stated her reasons why an attack should not be launched against the Eastern Tsin. Fu Chien said impatiently: You women do not understand state affairs! Was there anyone who supported Fu Chien's attack against the Eastern Tsin? Yes, there was one--Mu**Jung Chui**, a noble of Hsienpei. Mu**Jung Chui** tried to please Fu Chien by saying: Your Majesty's decision is a very clever one. Fu Chien, elated, praised Mu**Jung Chui**, saying that he was the only person who could help him dominate the world! As a matter of fact, for Mu**Jung** Chui to encourage him to attack the Eastern Tsin was a deliberate attempt to push him into the abyss. In the case of an attack against the Eastern Tsin, Fu Chien was totally isolated.

The stubborn Fu Chien kept his own counsel and decided to attack Tsin. This caused the former Ch'in community consternation. In 383 A.D., Fu Chien formally gave the order for general mobilization. One out of every ten common citizens was drafted and state- and private-owned

horses of all areas were commandeered. All young men under 20 from rich families who were skilled in martial arts were drafted into service. Altogether 30,000 such young men joined Fu Chien's personal guards. While the authorities were busy picking up men to serve, the number of draft-dodgers increased sharply. This created widespread apprehension and unrest in society. The draftees had no will to fight. What was the use of having even a million such soldiers? Fu Chien ordered Fu Jung, with Mu Jung Chui and others as his aides, to lead 250,000 foot soldiers and cavalrymen to move in the van. He also ordered Yao Chang of the Chiang tribe to lead the Szechwan troops eastward along the Yangtze. He himself led 600,000 foot soldiers and 270,000 cavalrymen for the offensive against the Eastern Tsin.

The Eastern Tsin closed its ranks in the face of an imminent attack from the enemy. Long before his all-out attack, Fu Chien had dispatched troops to capture Liang chou and Yi chou, thus gaining control of the upper reaches of the Yangtze and Han Rivers and removing a protective shield of the Eastern Tsin on its western flank. Though this breach was unfavorable to Eastern Tsin's defenses, it served to alert the Eastern Tsin defenders, making them see how superstitious they had been in relying solely on "the Yangtze River as a natural barrier against invaders." They set about seriously making defense preparations. At the same time, the fall of the Western Tsin due to its policy of non-resistance was a painful lesson, and the Eastern Tsin officials saw no way out except all-out resistance. In this grim situation, all the factions in the Eastern Tsin ruling circle strengthened their unity. Hsieh An first set in motion the southward migration of "refugees" north of the Huai River to the south in a "scorched earth" policy. This move was to forestall any attempt by the former Ch'in invaders to seize the Eastern Tsin's manpower to replenish their own manpower and military forces, and to make its rear areas stronger. As far as the "refugees" were concerned, they were happy to find steady work and to be of service. Militarily, General Chu Hsu was sent to hold Hsiangyang city and to defend northern Hupeh. In the meantime, Hsieh Hsüan urgently recruited and trained fighting men and organized new armed units. He put together a unit of crack troops called the "Peifu soldiers," who were to play a vital role in the Battle of Feishui.

A state of preparedness bolsters confidence. As the former Ch'in invaders were approaching its border, the Eastern Tsin was calm and ready to fight. Prime Minister Hsieh An was completely undisturbed, calmly giving orders to officers and men. This gave the army confidence. His composure inspired the poet Li Po to write: "Hsieh An was like a rock of the Eastern Hill; his talk and laughter could still the dust raised by invaders." This shows that Hsieh An was not only the leader of civilian officers but also a good model for army officers in military planning. Because of the numerical superiority of his army, Fu Chien ordered an attack on a broad front extending from northern Hupeh in the west to Shouyang in the east. Ch'in's main forces led by Fu Jung opened an assault on Shouyang, thus raising the curtain on the Battle of Feishui. At the time Tsin's main forces led by Hsieh Shih and Hsieh Hsüan had not

yet reached the Shouyang front. The city, weakly defended, fell. After taking the city, Fu Jung sent Liang Ch'eng to lead 50,000 men for an eastward push and camp at Lochien in order to stop Tsin's reinforcements from the east. Seeing that the Ch'in forces had beaten them to Shouyang, Hsieh Shih and Hsieh Hsüan decided to avoid reckless fighting, and camped 25 li away from Lochien, waiting for an opportunity to jump the enemy. Now the Ch'in troops received an intelligence report that the Eastern Tsin defenders at Hsiashih had run out of food. This so pleased Fu Chien that he believed that the days of the Eastern Tsin were numbered. He sent Chu Hsu, a Tsin general taken prisoner at Hsiangyang, to talk Hsieh Shih into surrendering. But Chu Hsu, "whose thoughts were with Tsin while he was a prisoner of Ch'in," not only not advised Hsieh Shih to surrender, but suggested to him a plan that could break the Ch'in army. Based on this plan, Hsieh Shih mapped out a strategy against Ch'in. Under the policy of active strategic defense, he sought a favorable moment to launch his attack, first striking at the vanguards of the Ch'in army and then winning a complete victory. At that time only a part of the Ch'in army had reached the battlefront, so the most urgent thing to do was to wipe out the 50,000 Ch'in troops under Liang Ch'eng who had dug in at Lochien. Hsieh Hsüan, commander of the vanguard units, sent Liu Lao-chih to lend 5,000 crack troops on a sneak attack on Lochien. The result was that the Ch'in commander Liang Ch'eng was killed and 15,000 Ch'in troops were wiped out. Riding on the crest of victory, Hsieh Shih and Hsieh Hsüan directed their troops to advance by water and land, forging ahead to the right bank of the Feishui River in a direct confrontation with the Ch'in army across the river. After suffering a defeat at Lochien, Fu Chien was somewhat scared. However, with a continuous flow of reinforcements, he still under-estimated the enemy. Taking advantage of Fu Chien's arrogance and over-confidence, Hsieh Hsüan asked Fu Chien to move his troops on the left bank back so as to leave room for the Eastern Tsin troops to cross the river and fight it out. The Ch'in generals all opposed moving the troops back to make room for a battlefield. However, Fu Chien presumptuously decided to accept Hsieh's request and planned to launch a surprise attack and defeat the Tsin troops when they were crossing the river. But, Fu Chien's army was made up of different factions with different command signals. When Fu Chien ordered the withdrawal, the troops kept moving back and could not be stopped, creating a turmoil. Seizing the opportunity, the commando units of the Tsin army crossed the river and pursued the Ch'in troops. Fu Jung's horse collapsed amid the commotion and Fu Jung was killed by the Tsin troops. At this time, Chu Hsu responded and shouted behind the Ch'in troops: "The Ch'in army has been defeated! The Ch'in army has been defeated!" The Ch'in army fell into complete disarray. While retreating, the soldiers of the Ch'in army were scared and jittery. They kept retreating day and night, with over half of them either killed or wounded. Fu Chien himself was wounded by an arrow. Bringing back whatever he could from the battlefield, he managed to escape back to Changan. Thus the 4-month long Battle of Feishui finally ended with Tsin as the victor and Ch'in as the loser.

It was not accidental that the Battle of Feishui ended in this way. So far as strength was concerned, the former Ch'in had the edge both economically and militarily. It had united the whole of Northern China, and controlled all the Yellow River Basin and the vast areas along the upper reaches of the Yangtze and Han Rivers with their fertile soil and abundant products. With the help of the Legalist Wang Meng, production in society was restored and developed to a certain extent. The Eastern Tsin Dynasty was confined to a small portion of the territory in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River. When the people moved from the north to the south, they brought with them some advanced techniques in agriculture, and farm production was developed to a certain extent. However, due to the limited land and a small population, the Eastern Tsin's material foundation was far weaker than that of the former Ch'in. Militarily, there was a great difference between 970,000 and 80,000 men. But the result of the war was that the Eastern Tsin defeated its adversary. The most important reasons were this: The Eastern Tsin made up for its economic and military weaknesses with its own internal unity and stability in its rear areas. On the contrary, the former Ch'in had weakened its strong economic and military dominant position by its own disunity and instability within its own ranks. In the face of Fu Chien's attack, the Eastern Tsin ruling circle, under Hsieh An's leadership, had always viewed the situation as a whole, united as one at all times, and reconciled a number of contradictions among its own ranks. Wang Tan-chih, who had worked with Hsieh An for many years, wrote in his testament: 'I have never talked about private ends with Hsieh An and Huan Ch'ung; we are only worried about the affairs of the state." From this, it can be seen that they had cooperated with one another very well. When Huan Ch'ung was the commanding general, he offered to send in 3,000 crack troops to guard the capital. Hsieh An, holding that the rear was quite safe and that soldiers should be placed on the frontline to strengthen national defense, declined Huan Ch'ung's offer. Since the beginning of Hsieh An's rule until the end of the Battle of Feishui, a situation of "harmony among generals and ministers" had prevailed among all civil and military high-ranking officials in the Eastern Tsin Dynasty. This was of great significance in defeating the former Ch'in. The situation of the former Ch'in was just the opposite. A number of its major internal contradictions were further sharpened by Fu Chien's mishandling. In addition, Fu Chien refused to listen to any opinion which differed from his own. He often conceitedly formulated erroneous political and military plans and made an unrealistic and wrong appraisal of the situation on both sides. He over-estimated his own strength, blindly under-estimated the enemy, and thus made a series of incorrect military deployments: First, Fu Chien sent out a million troops, nearly the entire army of the state, thus creating a vacuum in the rear and presenting an opportunity to the nobles of the Hsienpei and Chiang tribes to ferment a revolt. Second, the front was over-extended and the military forces were over-stretched. When the troops led by Fu Chien arrived in Hsiangch'eng, Honan, the troops from Liangchou had just reached Hsienyang and the troops from Szechwan had just set out. The head and the tail of the main force were 1,000 li apart, and the east front was 10,000 li from the west front. It was hard to move and direct the

entire army. The army was called "the mighty army of one million strong." Actually, only a small portion of the troops that had arrived at the front had engaged in actual combat. Third, another important reason for this military fiasco was the assignment to important posts of surrendered generals of the enemy such as MuJung Chui, Yao Chang, and others who were imbued with ideas of rebellion. Fourth, Fu Chien under-estimated the combat capability of the Tsin army, carelessly ordered the withdrawal on the battlefield, and let the Tsin army take the initiative while putting himself in a passive position. These military mistakes were not isolated phenomena, but were closely linked with his political mistakes--disunity within the ranks and instability in society. Commenting on Fu Chien, Legalist Wang An-shih of the Sung Dynasty said: "Fu Chien had high aims, but he failed to take advantage of the best opportunity. He was ambitious, but he lacked patience. The reason for his defeat was his failure to eliminate persons like MuJung Chui at home while trying to conquer Tsin abroad." ("Sequel to Tzu Chih T'ung Chien," Vol. 220) This was a logical comment.

In history, limited by their class nature, all exploiting classes and their political groups could at most achieve temporary and limited unity. Only the proletariat and its political party can forge truly strong and extensive revolutionary unity. "The proletarian is the greatest class in the history of mankind." "It can and must unite the overwhelming majority of people rally around itself and isolate and strike at the handful of the enemy to the maximum." Only with a common goal will it be possible to achieve unity; only by uniting as one will it be possible to become strong and invincible. The proletariat has a far-sighted and great political objective, namely, the liberation of the whole of mankind and the realization of communism. Inspired by this grand goal, let us further strengthen "the unification of our country, the unity of our people and the unity of our various nationalities' in order to make sure that even more glorious victories will be won in socialist revolution and socialist construction.

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The "Battle of 'War and Tear'" in North Shensi

by

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In early 1949, Chiang Kai-shek, after suffering a crushing defeat in his "all-round offensive" against our liberated areas, changed his tactics by launching "concentrated attacks" against the two liberated areas in north Shensi and Shantung. On the north Shensi battlefield, Hu Tsung-nan concentrated a force ten times larger than ours in an attempt to gobble up the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region, the seat of the central organs of the Chinese Communist Party. Under the wise command of the great leader Chairman Mao and in accordance with the strategic principles of mobile warfare, our Northwest Field Army took the initiative to abandon Yenan and adopted the "tactics of 'wear and tear'" to cope with the enemy. Under unimaginably difficult conditions, Chairman Mao and the central organs under him resolved to remain in north Shensi to give direct guidance to the fighting. In a little more than a year's time, our army attracted a large part of the enemy's main force, wiping out a hundred thousand enemy troops, smashing Chiang Kai-shek's "concentrated attacks" against the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region and effectively supporting the strategic counter-offensives launched by the two large armies commanded by Liu Po-ch'eng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing and by Ch'en Keng and Hsieh Fu-chih respectively, thus opening a new page in the history of China's revolutionary year.

Hu Tsung-nan Led By the Nose

One day in March 1947, gunshots by Hu Tsung-nan's offensive bandit troops were heard in the suburbs of Yenan.

Engraved on the magnificent wall of Yenan city was this eye-catching streamer: "There is a million strong troops in our minds!"

The slogan expressed the confidence of the armymen and civilians in Yenan, armed with Chairman Mao's proletarian military thinking, in the inevitability of their victory in face of a strong enemy force.

The reactionary army attacking north Shensi totalled 230,000 men, while the troops of our Northwest Field Army in north Shensi numbered a little more than 20,000. Thus the disparity was tremendous. However, as early as November 18, 1946, Chairman Mao had wisely predicted: "Now that we have wiped out 35 brigades of Chiang Kai-shek's troops and their offensive power is nearly exhausted, even if his troops should occupy Yenan by means of a sudden thrust, it would not damage the general prospect of victory in the people's war of liberation, nor could it save Chiang Kai-shek from the doom awaiting him." When the enemy was launching a ferocious attack on us, in order to aid the battlefield

in the Central Plains and East China by tying Hu Tsung-nan's main force in north Shensi, and win the final victory, Chairman Mao decided to temporarily abandon Yenan to lure the enemy in deep and war him down. "This may be called the tactics of 'wear and tear'; that is, of wearing the enemy down to complete exhaustion and then wiping him out." Chairman Mao educated the cadres and fighters in the experiences and lessons of the struggle between the two military lines in the history of the revolutionary war. During the Fifth Anti- "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign, Wang Ming's "Left" opportunist line applied the political slogan of abandoning not a single inch of territory to military tactics, calling for tough battles with the enemy regardless of one's own strength. This was a mistake. In abandoning territory, there may occur a situation in which only by abandoning some territory first can one gain it all back later; this may be called the principle of "one should give first in order to take." When people survive and the land is lost, both people and the land will eventually be preserved; when the land exists but people are lost, both the land and people will eventually be lost.

Armed with Chairman Mao's strategic thinking, the vast masses of armymen and civilians said jokingly: "Let Hu Tsung-nan come! We'll lead him by the nose and make him climb mountains. There are high mountains in north Shensi. The forests are dense and the paths are dangerous. When he has had it enough, we'll find an opportunity to wipe out his forces one by one!"

With 40 airplanes as his escorts and at the price of 5,000 casualties, Hu Tsung-nan entered Yenan gingerly on March 19 [1947]. He then celebrated his "exploits" in a big way, an act which deceived both himself and others as well. The enemy selected more than 1,000 glib soldiers from his own ranks to pretend to be captives from our army and had newsmen interview them in order to brag about the "victory." Chiang Kai-shek was pleased by the "victory" his most incompetent but favorite student had "won," decorating as well as promoting him.

However, while celebrating their illusive victory, these fanatic bandits became frightened: Why did the central organs of the Communist Party and the main force of the Northwest Field Army disappear suddenly, like a fish entering the sea? What was their next move? They used aircraft and ground troops to carry out reconnaissance missions everywhere, but all their efforts were fruitless. Even Mao Jen-feng (毛人凤), head of the enemy agents, was unable to get any information in this regard. This turned Hu Tsung-nan's bandit troops into the deaf and blind. In fact, ever since he occupied Yenan, he was led by us by the nose and could not go where he wanted to!

An "Old Ox" Walks Around the Mill

After pulling out of Yenan, the main force of our army amassed covertly along Chinghuapien northeast of Yenan, as instructed by Chairman Mao. According to Chairman Mao's analysis, the enemy had yet to

consolidate his foothold in Yenan, so he had to send out security forces to penetrate Panlung northeast of Yenan to bring about a situation in which he could take either the offensive or the defensive with ease. In Chinghuapien, the only route to Panlung, there was a big 30-li-long river and a highway flanked by high mountains. The place was a big trap, a good place to ambush the enemy.

To fight this battle well, it was necessary to lure the enemy's main force from northwest Yenan to Ansai. A certain unit of our army, charged with the task of "leading the ox," deliberately spread and marched across a mountain like a large force so that the enemy would discover it. Hu Tsung-nan, anxious to know our army's whereabouts, received with great joy an air force report on the discovery of "a large force" of ours. He immediately dispatched five brigades to chase after our unit. After luring the enemy into Ansai, this unit quietly returned to Chinghuapien the same night in order to participate in the ambush.

While the five brigades of the enemy were lured to Ansai, Hu Tsung-nan ordered his newly reorganized 31st brigade to move toward Chinghuapien in order to protect the flanks of his main force. This brigade walked right into our "trap."

The more than 10,000 men of our main force amassed in Chinghuapien, with the ardent desire to protect the Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao and to defend the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region and with bitter hatred for Hu Tsung-nan's bandit troops, hid in the foothills flanking the highway waiting for the enemy. In March, it was still very cold at night in north Shensi. The fighters felt their limbs become numb, but no one complained. Two airplanes appeared at daybreak. After hovering over the mountain twice, they discovered nothing suspicious and flew back to their home base. At 10 a.m. the vanguard units of the enemy entered the area where we had lain in ambush. They sneakily looked at the mountains on both sides of the highway and suddenly fired their machineguns at the mountains. After they ceased firing, they heard nothing but the rustling of the wind in the pines which sounded like roaring waves. Our troops stayed quiet. This was what the enemy called firepower reconnaissance. Seeing nothing, the enemy troops haughtily walked deep into "the trap."

When our scouts hiding at the foot of the hill reported to their commander that all the enemy troops had already entered the area of our planned ambush, the latter gave the order: "Charge!" All of a sudden, brilliant red flags and shining bayonets were seen everywhere on the high mountains. Like soldiers from heaven, our ambush troops moved down the hill, first closing the gap at the enemy's rear and then the enemy's escape exit. A whole brigade of the enemy troops was "wrapped up." Our army used the favorable terrain of high ground to launch a fierce attack against the enemy troops. More than 3,000 enemy troops were cut up and wiped out in only two hours, and the enemy brigade commander, Li Chi-yün, was captured alive. When he left the battlefield under guard, he was still puzzled, like in a dream, about where our troops had come from!

Let us go back to the main force of the five enemy brigades which had been lured to Ansai by a small diversionary force of ours. After an "armed parade," they suddenly discovered that our army had "disappeared." Puzzled and sulky, they then learned about the battle at Chinghuapien. Aware that they had been deceived, they turned around and rushed from Ansai to Yenan and then to Chinghuapien, thus making another "armed parade." When they arrived at Chinghuapien in a state of near exhaustion, our main force was already tens of li away, resting and consolidating.

The Chinghuapien battle was the first one our army fought and won after pulling out of Yenan. This was of great significance because it boosted the morale of our army and people and destroyed the enemy's arrogance. More important still, it proved the correctness of the principles of operation formulated by Chairman Mao for the northwest battlefield. We were not concerned with the capture or abandonment of a city or a place; our main aim was to wipe out enemy effectives. As long as we used the very favorable terrain and the support of the masses in north Shensi to cope with the enemy and to nibble at him mouthful by mouthful, the enemy forces would eventually be annihilated and Yenan would return to our hands.

Rely on the Masses To "Wear and Tear" the Enemy

The telling blow at Chinghuapien knocked Hu Tsung-nan silly. He pressed his eight or nine brigades hard to seek out and fight our main force. Under the command of Chairman Mao and closely relying on the masses of the people in north Shensi, our army goaded Hu Tsung-nan to continue "pulling the mill."

The masses in north Shensi had been living by the side of Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee for more than a decade, and they obeyed Chairman Mao most faithfully. When Hu Tsung-nan came, they promptly responded to Chairman Mao's call, carried out a scorched earth policy, and took up all kinds of weapons to defend their homeland and strike at the enemy. Hu Tsung-nan's bandit troops had to pay the price for every step they advanced in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region. The deeper they moved into the liberated areas, the heavier the blows to them became.

Hu Tsung-nan's intention was to force our central organs and main force to cross the Yellow River. As a first step, he tried to push us toward the north. We "catered to the enemy's desire" and moved two battalions, pretending to be larger units, toward the north, while concealing our main force right under Hu Tsung-nan's nose. Having learned a lesson at Chinghuapien, the enemy no longer dared risk the mountain roads. Instead, they used a square formation with tens of thousands of men stretching several dozen li on each side. They marched and camped at the same time, thinking that they could thus avoid exposing their weak points and being wiped out one by one. During the day, they climbed over one mountain ridge after another. At night, they slept on

the mountain, not daring to go down the hill and into the villages. Wherever they went, they could not find a single grain of rice from the local people and often had to eat mildewed wheat cakes. Moreover, not a single person gave them any information about our army's movement. On the contrary, sometimes they were fooled by the local grandmas. They failed to find what they wanted wherever they passed by. In the meantime, they were constantly being harassed by our militia and guerrilla units and were in constant fear. It was really tough on them. Thus they moved from Yench'ang to Chingchien via Yench'uan and then turned west to Wayaopao, marching 300 li in hunger and gaining nothing. Their officers were grumbling, and more and more soldiers deserted. Hu Tsung-nan was raving mad but helpless. He could only order his units to turn back south and get replenished in the Panlung and Chinghuapien areas.

The old ox wanted to stop pulling the mill, but that should not be permitted! We sent a small detachment to whip the enemy sharply at his backside. Finding our force at his back, the enemy made an about face and again moved northward to "pull the mill," despite exhaustion and hunger.

At this juncture, as the enemy began to show fatigue and hunger, some people in our army had the idea of hurrying north to attack Yulin or moving south to cut off the enemy's retreat. Chairman Mao, after incisively analyzing the situation at that time, issued an instruction on April 15: "The enemy is now quite tired, but not yet tired out. He is in considerable difficulties with his food supply, but not yet in extreme difficulties." "There is no need for our main force to hurry north to attack Yulin or south to cut off the enemy's retreat." "Our policy is to continue our former method, that is, to keep the enemy on the run in this area for a time (about another month); the purpose is to tire him out completely, reduce his food supplies drastically and then look for an opportunity to destroy him."

It was at this moment that our army, persistently keeping the enemy on the run along the line between Wayaopao and Yenan, found an opportunity in the Yangmaho area to wipe out bandit Hu's 135th brigade, capturing the brigade commander Mai Tsung-yu alive and seizing large quantities of US weapons and equipment. This further demoralized the enemy forces. Hu Tsung-nan had no choice but to pull his hungry troops back to Panlung to be fed. After the Yangmaho battle, in order to further carry out Chairman Mao's "tactics of 'wear and tear'" and create conditions "for tiring him out completely, cutting off all his food supplies and finally wiping him out," our army selected Panlung as the target of attack.

Lead the Enemy Away and the Rest Will Be Easy

Located 90 li northeast of Yenan, Panlung was the enemy's strategic supply center in north Shensi. There were large quantities of food, clothing and other military supplies stockpiled there, and the enemy would return there for re-supply after every major military operation.

If we could take Panlung, we would cut off the enemy's food and clothing supplies, a fatal blow to the enemy. However, precisely because Panlung was so important, the enemy guarded it more tightly. Defending Panlung was Hu Tsung-nan's 167th brigade, one of his so-called "four invincibles." The hills surrounding Panlung were dotted with many semi-permanent defense works, and at the time Hu Tsung-nan's main force of more than a hundred thousand men were deployed around Panlung. Therefore, to take Panlung, it was necessary first of all to lead Hu Tsung-nan's main force away.

Under the direct command of Chairman Mao, our army started a combat operation to "lure the tiger out of the mountain." Our 359th brigade pretended to be the entire body of the Northwest Field Army, calling the brigade headquarters field-army headquarters and the various detachments columns, in order to get Hu Tsung-nan on the hook and lead him to move from Panlung to Sui-te, where he would dangle in the air midway between Yulin and Yenan. In the meantime, our main force was concealed in an area not far from Panlung. If only the 359th brigade could lead the enemy into Sui-te city, our main force would attack Panlung. By the time the enemy learned aboutthis and wanted to return to the aid of Panlung, it would take him at least five days, and we would be assured of victory.

To make the enemy bite and hold on to the bait, our 359th brigade also took a series of deceptive actions. On its retreat, our army had made every place it evacuated look like a "large army evacuating hastily": there were broken door planks, stretchers, and old uniforms not yet dry from laundering scattered all over. We deliberately left some scraps of paper supposedly used for drafting orders on the muddy ground; one read, "....to preserve our effective forces....immediately shift....to....group....prepare....cross the river to the east." Hu Tsung-nan thought that he had really found our mysterious, unfathomable main force, and so he firmly tailed our 359th brigade moving toward Sui-te.

According to our arrangements, the enemy's main force was led to Sui-te on May 2. On the same day, our main force launched its attack on Panlung. This made the enemy radio telephones very busy. Between Sui-te, Panlung and Sian, a heated quarrel developed, which was so funny that we were choked with laughter. First, the enemy occupying Sui-te reported his "victory" to Hu Tsung-nan in Sian. Next, the enemy in Panlung made an emergency appeal to Hu Tsung-nan for help. Hu Tsung-nan gave Li K'un-kang (enemy brigade commander) in Panlung a dressing down, saying that obviously the communist main force had been driven to the north of Sui-te, that there could not be any large communist force to attack Panlung, and that there was nothing to get so excited about. Li K'un-kang swore that the force attacking Panlung was the real communist main force; so Hu Tsung-nan turned his wrath on his man in Sui-te, saying that he was a damn fool and had fallen into a communist trap. The enemy in Sui-te pleaded innocent, saying that it was absolutely true that the communist main force had reached the Yellow River. Hu Tsung-nan sent airplanes over the Yellow River to reconnoiter. Our force made a false appearance of busily crossing the river in boats, so Hu Tsung-nan

was convinced by his man in Sui-te and scathingly abused his man in Panlung, until Li K'un-kang swore on his life, wept into the telephone and begged for help.... While the enemy was in utter confusion, like a host of heavenly warriors, our force stormed the enemy positions on the night of May 4, breaking into the heavily fortified Panlung, totally wiping out the enemy's "trump card," the 167th brigade, and killing or capturing more than 7,000 men from Li K'un-kang on down. The huge stockpiles of enemy supplies in this strategic supply depot, including 12,000 sacks of flour, 40,000 uniforms and more than 1,000 mules and horses, all became supplies for our army. Hu Tsung-nan was truly a "worthy pupil" of the "logistic transport brigade commander" Chiang Kai-shek.

The taking of Panlung was like overturning the enemy's cooking pot. Hanging in "midair" solitarily, the enemy's main force in Sui-te had nothing to eat and nothing to wear and moved back dejectedly. On their way back, the enemy troops had nothing but corn stalks to eat for several weeks and even in July still wore their tattered, cotton-padded uniforms. The stout men wore themselves thin and the thin men wore themselves to death. Countless men deserted or inflicted wounds on themselves.

Our great leader Chairman Mao personally directed the army and the people in north Shensi to use the "tactics of 'wear and tear'" to lead Hu Tsung-nan into a blind alley step by step. The turning point in the northwestern theater of the war was at hand!

The Decisive Battle

In August, winds were rising and clouds gathering over the ancient Great Wall. Following Chairman Mao's instructions, our Northwest Field Army's main force was closing in on Yulin, a well-known city on the Great Wall, causing great panic in the enemy camp. Fearing that we might seize this strategic city, a gateway to North China, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian to personally work out a strategy which would rescue him from defeat.

With Chiang Kai-shek's personal appearance on the stage, a grand show was about to begin in the north Shensi battlefield.

Why did Chiang Kai-shek come in person? Because his forces were also going downhill in the Central China theater. He was anxious to have a showdown with us in north Shensi with the aim of annihilating our forces so that he could throw Hu Tsung-nan's forces into the Central China theater as a major task force.

Chairman Mao's strategic plan was to lure Hu Tsung-nan's main force into moving north by an attack on Yulin, and tie him down there so he could not spare troops for anything else. This was to facilitate the Yellow River crossing operation of our forces commanded by Ch'en /Keng/ and Hsieh /Fu-chih/, which would then coordinate with the forces of Liu /Po-ch'eng/ and Teng /Hsiao-p'ing/ which had successfully crossed the Yellow River and the East China Field Army which had already smashed the enemy's concentrated attacks in storming the central plains.

As soon as the Yulin campaign started, the enemy's main force, dividing into two columns, rushed in to relieve the besieged city. One column composed of two brigades and led by Chung Sung, commander of the enemy's 36th division, advanced along the Great Wall; the other column, composed of eight brigades and led by Liu Kan, advanced along the Hsienyang-Yulin highway. Seeing that the aim of starting the Yulin campaign to lure the enemy to move north had been reached and that our forces had wiped out over 5,000 enemy soldiers on the outskirts of Yulin, Chairman Mao resolutely issued the order to pull out from the siege. Our main force was then ordered to march south from Yulin and lie hidden in the Shachiatien area, awaiting an opportune moment to wipe out more enemy troops.

In mid-August, trailing at the heels of our forces, the two columns composed of a total of 100,000 men and led by Chung Sung and Liu Kan respectively arrived at Shachiatien and its vicinity successively. Here both our main force and that of the enemy were crowding into this small area of less than 100 square li. It was here that Chairman Mao decided to engage the enemy in a decisive battle--the Shachiatien Battle--that would decide the fate of the Northwest China theater.

Chairman Mao, the leader of the people, was with the people. He personally led the Party's central organs to fight in north Shensi, arranging for battle after battle for victory and grave after grave for the enemy. Now Chairman Mao had arrived at a small village only 20 li from Shachiatien to personally direct the Shachiatien Battle.

We of course could not swallow the hundred thousand enemies at one gulp. Our policy was to concentrate a superior force to attack isolated enemy units first. Since entering the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region, Liu Kan had suffered one defeat after another and had become quite wary. Thus, after his arrival in Shachiatien, he positioned his eight brigades close to one another. This made it impossible for us to attack them at an advantage. However, Chung Sung was different. His "meritorious service in rescuing Yulin" had made him arrogant. After entering the Shachiatien area, he had the audacity to divide his two brigades into two columns--with the 123rd brigade as the forward echelon and the 165th brigade led by himself trailing behind some distance away. This provided our forces an opportunity to wipe out the enemy forces one by one. Our main force immediately encircled the two enemy brigades in separate areas. At the same time, other troops were organized and ready to block Liu Kan's rescuing efforts. When Chung Sung suddenly spotted our main forces on both his flanks, he was panic-stricken and cabled Hu Tsung-nan for help. Loudly cursing him on the radio telephone, Hu Tsung-nan ordered him to "hold your position at all costs and wait for reinforcements." At the same time Hu hastily cabled Liu Kan to send reinforcements to rescue Chung Sung. But Liu Kan, already frightened to death by our forces, was reluctant to adventure too far from his positions on the Yellow River bank. Therefore, not until the next afternoon did he reluctantly send his troops. But they were met with stiff resistance by our troops. Separated by a distance of no more than 30 li, the

two enemy forces were unable to join each other. With an ashen face, Hu Tsung-nan issued an order to fire Liu Kan and have him court-martialed.

Amid the exciting sound of bugles and shouting of the slogan "Defend the Party Central Committee, defend Chairman Mao, defend the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia border region," our forces, like a tiger charging down from the mountain, rushed toward the enemy. The thundering gunfire was like water pouring down from a breached dam, killing and wounding enemy soldiers who were fleeing like rats and crying for their mums and dads. Dispirited and at his wit's end, Chung Sung shouted himself hoarse into the telephone "Pack howitzers! Pack Howitzers!" But of the 36th division's 12 pack howitzer pieces, nine had become unserviceable after half a year of "'wear and tear' fighting" and had been sent back to the rear area depots. The three remaining howitzers were all silenced by our powerful artillery fire. Although Chiang Kai-shek--crouched in Sian at the time--sent several airplanes to drop bombs, they did little to stop the valiant advance of the powerful Liberation Army. After a few hours' combat, the once swaggering 36th division was completely wiped out by our forces. Liu Tzu-ch'i, commander of the enemy 123rd brigade,was captured alive. Chung Sung, the divisional commander, and Li Jih-chi, commander of the 165th brigade, escaped under the cover of darkness by dressing in civilian clothes.

The overwhelming and dazzling victory had finally come! The enemy had gone down like an avalanche of snow. On the third day of our victory in Shachiatien, our Ch'en-Hsieh forces successfully crossed the Yellow River and marched into Honan, thus giving powerful support to the Liu-Teng forces in their drive toward the areas between Nanking and Wuhan--the heartland of the Kuomintang. At the same time, the Ch'en-Hsieh forces were threatening Tungkuan and menacing Hu Tsung-nan's old lair. This series of chain reactions greatly accelerated our army's strategic counter-offensive. Hu Tsung-nan urgently ordered Liu Kan's forces to flee toward the south, and our forces were in hot pursuit!

On April 21, 1948, the sunshine of spring again shone on a liberated Yenan. The Paota Mountain looked even more beautiful and magnificent while still engulfed with the smoke of gunpowder. The rapidly flowing waters of the Yen River also sang joyous odes to Chairman Mao's great military thinking!

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Firmly Grasp Initiative

- Some understanding from studying Chairman Mao's military thinking

by

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When two armies are at war, the key for either to win lies in whether or not it can master the initiative. Because of this, the commander must strive to gain the initiative in battle.

Chairman Mao says: "Initiative means an army's freedom of action." He also points out: "Freedom of action is the lifeblood of an army." Freedom is derived from an understanding of necessity and the transformation of the objective world. Only on the basis of knowing the inevitable can man acquire freedom of action. Initiative is not innate in the mind of a military man, nor will it emerge naturally; it is something attained "through correct assessment of conditions (of our and enemy's sides) and correct military and political decisions." Military laws, as other laws, are the reflection of objective reality in our minds. Only by knowing the enemy and ourselves and discovering the laws of action can our army have the right of freedom. That is why, if you want to gain the initiative in war, you must, in the practice of revolutionary war, make your subjective thinking correspond with the objective laws of the war. During the war years of the past, the reason why we were able to defeat the enemy and obtain freedom was that we correctly understood and applied the laws of war. This shows that understanding the laws of war and using them to dynamically direct the fighting, we shall be able to obtain freedom and grasp the initiative. The more thoroughly we understand the laws of war, the greater will be our freedom and initiative.

In war, one's superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war is the objective basis for one being in an active or passive position. However, the state of superiority or inferiority and initiative or passivity as between the enemy and ourselves is not absolute and unchangeable. Superiority contains factors of inferiority, and inferiority also contains factors of superiority; in the course of war, under given conditions these factors may transform into each other. At the beginning of the ten-year civil war, Chiang Kai-shek had an army of 1,500,000 men, airplanes and tanks. The Workers and Peasants Red Army led by Chairman Mao had only slightly over 10,000 men and 2,000 rifles, and yet it grew from small to big and from weak to strong and ultimately defeated the superior 8-million troops of Chiang Kai-shek. The laws of war tell us: "The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by men." Viewing the problem from

its essence, the superiority in military strength of Chiang Kai-shek was only a temporary phenomenon and a factor playing only a temporary role, but the factor--lack of popular support--played a constant role. Because his force was a decadent force, his superiority had to transform into its opposite. The revolutionary army at the beginning was weak, but it was one supported by the people and one that would progress. So, it was bound to develop. The fact that it was able to change from weak to strong, from being inferior to superior, from a passive to an active position was precisely because it met the objective laws governing the development of the revolution. Only by seeing such inevitability can we be sure of grasping the initiative and winning victory in a war.

However, initiative "is not ready-made but is something that requires conscious effort." Inferiority can be transformed into superiority and vice versa; this is merely a kind of possibility, and "to translate this kind of possibility into reality, it will be necessary to have a correct policy and exert subjective efforts. At this time, the subjective role becomes decisive." Developing man's dynamic role is a necessary condition for winning initiative. Very often, a superior army sustains defeat because of mistakes made in subjective command; an inferior army wins because of its correct subjective guidance. This shows that the correctness or incorrectness of subjective command on the part of the commander influences the change of superiority or inferiority, initiative or passivity. Because of this, initiative and victory will definitely not come to those who merely sit and wait. We must, based on the objective conditions of war, create conditions to gradually break away from an inferior and passive position and seize the initiative of war from the hands of those enjoying superiority and initiative.

The subjective dynamic role of the commander is mainly manifested in applying his plan to war. Planning finds concrete expression in preparations for and assessment of war. Victory in war "is impossible without planning"; "without this condition, there can be no initiative, flexibility, offensive, etc." Correct planning comes from the subjective thinking of the commander and his understanding of the laws of war. All kinds of plans, tactical, operational or strategic, are not in the abstract but are "based on the general conditions of both sides in war." The rapid development of war, the constant changes in the conditions between the enemy and ourselves, and particularly changes on the part of the enemy are most difficult to calculate, giving war its unpredictable nature, which, however, is not beyond observation or scrutiny. A commander's "open-minded study and correct appraisal of the objective conditions" gives war a certain degree of relative certainty, enabling him to draw up a workable plan and apply it in directing war and to gain the initiative in war. When the War of Resistance against Japan broke out, both the possibilities of victory and national subjugation existed simultaneously. Based on the relative strength of the enemy and our own weakness, the small size of the enemy and the vastness of our country, the regressive nature of the enemy and the progressive nature on our part, the unjust cause and lack of support of the enemy and the just cause and abundant support of our side at that time,

Chairman Mao scientifically drew up strategic and tactical plans for three stages of the protracted war against Japan, that is, defense, stalemate and offense. Thanks to correct planning, we finally won and eliminated the possibility of national subjugation. In conducting a war, if we do not adopt as meticulous a plan as possible within the boundary of objective conditions but act blindly in contravention to objective laws, we would fall into a passive position and, as a result, suffer setbacks everywhere and lose our initiative. The subjective dynamic role of the commander must be brought into play throughout the planning of war. The rapid progress of war and the constant changes in the condition of war necessarily make a plan uncertain, and this requires the commander to change his subjective thought in keeping with the change of objective conditions and to revise his plan promptly and properly. The relative certainty of a plan and its changeability are a unity of opposites. To negate a relatively fixed war plan or policy in a given period of time is to negate man's subjective dynamic role in war. On the other hand, not to replace or change it promptly on the basis of changing circumstances and the fluidity of war but to implement it rigidly would make one a mechanical materialist. In war, "making or changing tactical, campaign and strategic plans in accordance with respective circumstance is a key factor in directing a war; it embodies the flexibility of war, the skillful application of plans." Such "skillful application" of war plans is entirely determined by the extent of development of the commander's subjective dynamic role in war.

Flexibility means further bringing into play of the subjective dynamic role of the commander. Planning is a product of preconception, but war in the concrete is animated, lively and always changing. In order to carry out a war plan, the commander must link up planning with flexibility. What is flexibility? Flexibility "is a product of concrete realization of initiative in military operations; it is flexible employment of military force." Flexible employment of military force involves three essential elements, timing, location and the army unit. If we attack the wrong place at the wrong time and know not the conditions of our unit, we will not be able to score victory. Flexibility finds expression in the commander's skill not only in applying tactics but also in varying them. "To make changes properly and in good time according to the conditions of our troops and terrains of both sides is an important task for flexible command." A common saying goes, "Opportunity must not be lost; it will not come again." In war, both sides want to hold the initiative and to avoid falling into passivity. Seizing the operational opportunity that would decide the outcome of the overall war requires the commander to employ his forces flexibly, to resort to all kinds of tactics,and to deprive the enemy of his opportunity. After the victory of the Liaohsi-Shenyang campaign, our army engaged the Kuomintang in the Northeast theater in a battle that was to have vital bearing later on. At that time the enemy in North China had become "a bird startled by the mere twang of a bowstring," and he was trying to pull back and escape before we completed the dispositions for the Peiping-Tientsin campaign. To gain time and pin the enemy down and wipe him out, we moved troops to encircle Changchiakou and Hsinpao-an and adopted the flexible

tactic of "encircling without attacking." This gave the enemy the wrong impression that our army was about to attack Changchiakou and Hsinpao-an and upset his plans. At the same time, we kept our troops in such places as Tientsin and Tangku and adopted the flexible tactic of "cutting off without encircling" to cut off the links between the various enemy units. In this way, we tied the enemy down, giving ourselves the time to deploy our forces and make proper preparations, thereby mastering the initiative for destroying the enemy. Flexibility is also expressed by flexible use of different tactics and methods of fighting by the commander based on different enemy situations, different battle objectives and different locations. In leading and directing China's revolutionary war, Chairman Mao flexibly adopted different tactics based on the concrete conditions in various periods. Under the situation in which the enemy was strong and we were weak, we avoided fighting on the interior lines, and adopted the method of fighting of hit and run and guerrilla warfare. When we enjoyed relative partial superiority, we would lure the enemy in deep to areas favorable to us, and adopt the method of "concentrating a superior force to fight a battle of annihilation." When the enemy forces were dispersed but could not yet be destroyed by us, we would adopt the method of "encircling without attacking" or "cutting off without encircling." When the enemy was concentrating his forces to attack us, we would adopt the method of "move away first and strike at them later." All these methods of fighting were the embodiment of bringing into play the commander's ability to direct the war and his flexible use of his forces. During war, special conditions would often appear suddenly, requiring the commander to work out a flexible method of operation in a split second to deal with the complex situation. At the time of the Third Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign, based on the situation in which the enemy was strong and we were weak, our army formulated a plan for breaking from Hsingkuo to the west into Fut'ien, getting around the enemy and then attacking his weaker units at his rear. But the tricky enemy suddenly concentrated a force of two divisions and rushed them to Fut'ien. In view of this sudden change, we at once altered our plan and decided to break into Huangp'o in the east, thereby causing the enemy to miss his target. We then got around to the rear of the enemy and attacked him by surprise. This swift military action resulted in a partial overwhelming over the enemy's superiority and brought about the victory in the Third Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign. Flexible use of forces and variation of tactics positively guarantees the course of turning passivity into activity and inferiority into superiority. Running away is for the sake of fighting better; retreating is for the sake of better advance later. Strategic and tactical flexibility creates local superiority and local initiative in many places. As more gains are made and a new stage is reached, a major change will occur in the degree of strength and weakness and in the situation of inferiority and superiority, resulting in the defeat of the enemy and our victory. Therefore, "flexibility is the concrete expression of initiative" and "the most important means of changing the situation as between the enemy and ourselves and of gaining the initiative." Flexibility is definitely not the product of subjective wishes, but the result of "skillful application" in war of the wise commander's subjective thinking based on objective laws.

In order to gain the initiative in war, it is necessary to use the viewpoint of dialectical materialism to observe problems and to overcome mechanical materialism. When dealing with the dialectical relationship between the development of subjective effort and the gaining of initiative, Chairman Mao points out: "In seeking victory, those who direct a war cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the objective conditions; within these limitations,however, they can and must play a dynamic role in striving for victory." Mechanical materialists invariably separate the subjective from the objective, and knowledge from practice. In war they see only the factor of weapons and not the factor of man. During the War of Resistance against Japan, exaggerating the role of weapons, the national subjugationists failed to see the strength of the people, and so they put forth the fallacy "with inferior weapons China must go down in defeat in war." Did they not give the initiative in war to the enemy? Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is the people, not things, that are decisive. The victory of the anti-Japanese war forcefully proves this. It doesn't mean that material conditions are not needed in giving play to the subjective role. Spiritual things can be transformed into material things because they are integrated with certain material conditions. However, the initiative has to be gained by man; he must create the conditions and he cannot gain the initiative by waiting for these conditions to materialize. Strategic and tactical principles must be adapted to the changes and development of war, but the mechanical materialists regard them as totally rigid. The so-called "six tactical principles" trumpeted by Lin Piao are metaphysical and a reproduction of the asinine war formula of the Confucianist who held that "soldiers will not form ranks unless drums are beaten." The employment of these principles to war would naturally lead to the loss of initiative and ultimate defeat. To gain the initiative in war, it is necessary to oppose such mechanism on the problem of war.

The initiative in revolutionary war is gained through tortuous struggle. Military struggle is not only a complex struggle between the enemy and ourselves, it is also a struggle between correct and wrong military lines within the army. The movement of these opposites in war make the twists and turns in gaining initiative. The subjective role of the commander comes into play when he is good at gaining initiative amid tortuous struggle. Both the War of Resistance against Japan and the War of Liberation were won after initiative was gained during fighting. Although twists and turns appearing in war give us temporary difficulties, they nevertheless create the conditions for defeating the enemy. The failure of the Fifth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign forced the Red Army to undertake the 25,000-li Long March, which must be considered a big twist. However, by taking this tortuous road, we gained the initiative. Although the road is tortuous, the future is bright. But the bright future is seen through a tortuous road. If we fail to see such devious nature of revolutionary war but want to gain the initiative smoothly, we would only delude ourselves. To feel helpless and despondent when the revolution meets with setbacks or to feel conceited and blindly optimistic when the revolution develops smoothly--

both these sentiments will prevent us from gaining the initiative in revolution. Such lessons from the history of revolutionary war deserve to be remembered by us forever.

Winning the initiative in revolutionary war does not mean that we will not have to do hard work any more; on the contrary, we must consolidate it through struggle. Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, our army finally gained the initiative in war, defeated imperialism and the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek and seized political power after arduous struggles. Today, under the victorious situation, we cannot afford to sit back and relax. No doubt, initiative in revolution can only be gained by the proletariat and the revolutionary people, but so long as classes and class struggle exist, if we do not heighten our vigilance, there will be the possibility of our losing the initiative. To firmly grasp the initiative we have gained in struggle, we must, in light of the three kinds of great revolutionary practice, diligently study Chairman Mao's military dialectical thinking, correctly understand the dialectical relationship between initiative and passivity, superiority and inferiority, and gain and loss, and use them to direct the various tasks of socialist revolution and socialist construction. We must sum up the experience, strengthen unity, develop and consolidate revolutionary initiative in the struggle, and score still greater victories.

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On How To Promote More Substantial Rise in Grain Production

by

the CCP Committee of Ch'ungming Hsien

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Editorial Note:

The following article deals with how the Ch'ungming hsien Party committee, in setting plans for developing agriculture, seriously analyzed the past and present situations in order to make fullest use of the favorable conditions to overcome various difficulties and to build their fighting goals for sustained, large increase of grain production on a firmer basis. This method of planning for the future through an analysis of past and current conditions is a practical and scientific approach to work; it is also a Marxist way of doing things that our Party has consistently advocated. It is our hope that other units will adopt this work attitude in drawing up and carrying out their own long-range plans.

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Agriculture is the foundation for developing the national economy, and grain is the foundation of this foundation. "The purpose of all labor is primarily to obtain and produce food." Therefore, the first and foremost problem in speeding up the construction of Ch'ungming Island is how to develop grain production at a high speed.

The grain production rate of Ch'ungming hsien has been relatively rapid over the past eight years of the great proletarian cultural revolution. This year it is estimated that the total grain output will exceed 550 million catties, and the annual per-mow yield of the hsien's 395,000 mow of farmland -- excluding the newly reclaimed areas -- will be approximately 1,350 catties, showing a rise of 42 percent and 35 percent over 166 respectively and also an average annual increase of 4.8 percent and 4 percent. There are two main factors underlying the substantial rise in grain production over the past eight years, the first being the reform of the tillage system. Originally, there used to be two crops a year, whereas now three crops have been gradually reaped. The acreage of grain fields has increased by 320,000 mow, and the multiple crop index has risen from 200 percent in 1966 to 240 percent. The second factor is the improvement of production conditions, particularly the achievements in the construction of irrigation systems, soil transformation and farm mechanization. The amount of earth dug up annually over the past eight years reached eight million

cubic feet. One-third of the total farming areas, which used to be low-lying or rugged, has been levelled and cultivated and is now suitable for crop rotation between paddy and dry crops. The area irrigated by use of electric power now covers over 80 percent of the total farm acreage, compared with 40 percent in 1966. The machine-plowed area which used to be well below 10 percent in 1966, has grown to approximately 90 percent. Live hogs bred average about one head for each mow of land, resulting in a great increase of organic manure. All this has contributed immensely to the achievements in raising productivity and establishing the "three crops a year system." Apart from this, we have also continued to reclaim wasteland, adding over 40,000 mow of land to our grain fields, another factor in the increase of grain production.

Recently, together with the people of the whole hsien, we have worked out a ten-year program, 1975 to 1985, for the development of agriculture. The problem now is whether it is possible to further raise grain production in the next ten years from the present relatively high level. Actually, there are several objective difficulties in doing this: the "three crops system" is already in full force, the multiple crop index has nearly reached the point of saturation, and communes in the hsien will no longer reclaim new lands on a large scale because the reclamation of wasteland will be undertaken mainly by state farms under municipal jurisdiction. Therefore, the only way to develop grain production at a high rate of increase in the next ten years will be to find a way to increase the per-mow yield. This would, of course, be more difficult than trying to raise the multiple crop index or reclaim more land for farming purposes. But the fact of the matter is that our grain yield per-unit-area is still relatively low, and much lower than that of some advanced units. This means that there is still great potential in further increasing grain yield per-unit-area.

At present, there is still great disequilibrium in the grain yield of various communes, production brigades and teams across the hsien. While 108 brigades have succeeded in producing over 1,400 catties of grain per mow, 263 brigades have not attained this level, and there are 37 others which even failed to exceed a thousand catties. If those brigades producing less than 1,400 catties per mow could achieve this target, this alone would boost the average per-mow output of grain in the hsien by over 150 catties. Reasons for this production lag are numerous. Poor water and soil conditions are important ones. As Marx said, "The productivity of agricultural labor is closely related to natural conditions." It follows that changing the natural conditions is the key to raising grain output per-unit-area.

Surrounded by water, the Ch'ungming Island on the whole has rather favorable water and soil conditions. But because it is located at the mouth of the Yangtse River, the island is frequently attacked by typhoons and high tides, and the underground water level is rather high. These are unfavorable conditions. Since liberation, owing to

the superiority of the socialist economy, great progress has been attained in farmland capital construction--building dikes and dams, resisting salinity, lowering the water level, levelling the ground, dredging and widening waterways. But at present the large dikes are not high or strong enough to resist fierce typhoons and the resultant tidal waves. Moreover, with the retardation of the river flow, the inward drift of the sea water toward the land is growing steadily worse. In the last two years, the entire island was impounded by sea water for more than two months during the spring, with the threat of salt water invasion aggravated further. The relatively high level of underground water is also bad for the growth of wheat crops. The way to overcome strong typhoons and tidal waves is thus to strengthen the dikes around the island. To prevent sea water from entering, it is necessary to adjust the water system, raise the capacity to retain and release water, build more sluice gates, strengthen the drawing of water from the south and draining it to the north, and dredge a 70-kilometer long trunk canal. In order to lower the underground water level and improve the soil, a general land-levelling project must be carried out, gullies between fields must be filled in, and special efforts should be made to level and transform the rugged, low-lying and saline areas measuring some 140,000 mow. These capital construction works call for the removal of over 80,000,000 cubic feet of earth, long enough to go around the globe twice. Whether such a tremendous earth-digging project can be completed by stages within the next ten years and particularly within the next five years is of utmost importance to our effort to raise grain production per-unit-area by improving water and soil conditions. Chairman Mao points out: "Socialism has not only liberated labor and the means of production from the old society, it has also liberated the great world of nature which the old society could never learn to harness." According to our calculations, within the next five years, an average of 12 million cubic feet of earth will have to be removed. If each laborer can dig up an average of 2.5 cubic feet per day, 100,000 laborers would have to be mobilized to work one and a half months each year. This amount of work would be 50 percent more than the average annual amount of work done in the past eight years; this is, of course, a very arduous task. Nonetheless, we firmly believe that it can be accomplished through hard work. "The most powerful productive force is the revolutionary class itself." In 1958, we mobilized 100,000 people and dug up more than 7 million cubic feet of earth in only 28 days. In the meantime we constructed a 78-kilometer long canal, improving the irrigation system and creating favorable conditions for the eventual realization of the "three crops system." Today, the broad masses of poor and lower-middle peasants are showing more enthusiasm for socialism. They say: "One cannot walk in long strides with bound feet; a high level of production cannot be gained by adhering to old methods and ideas." Some advanced units have already started changing the face of the Ch'ungming Island. In recent years, the broad masses and cadres of No. 8 production brigade of Tahsin commune have been actively engaged in building new irrigation works during winter and spring and levelling the land in connection with farm work. For six years they have striven with might and main under the militant

slogan, 'Learn from Tachai with a strong will, and resolve to rebuild our brigade," basically completing their plans to "transform land into garden-like fields with standard ridges and a network of irrigation facilities." Since 1969, the brigade's grain yield per mow has risen from 1,408 catties to about 1,700 catties, and its cotton yield per mow from 140 catties to approximately 180 catties. Thus, as long as we firmly believe in the strength of the masses of the people and resolutely carry out the policy of capital construction in water conservancy and soil improvement "by putting stress on small projects, subsidiary works and operation by communes and brigades," it is quite possible to change the natural conditions generally and combat flood and drought successfully after ten years of hard work and struggle, and to increase grain production per-unit-area generally.

The "Eight-Point Charter for Agriculture" (soil, fertilizer, water, seed, close planting, crop protection, field care and technical innovation) covers the ties between all aspects of natural conditions for agricultural production, and not one item is dispensable. In the case of the Ch'ungming Island, besides water and soil, there is also a serious problem of seeds, which are an extremely important natural factor in farming. As Chairman Mao says: "With good seed strains, we can attain higher yields without having to increase manpower or fertilizer." At present, over 50 percent of Ch'ungming's grain seeds in use are high-quality seeds. This is another major factor in the per-mow grain yield increase in the eight years of the cultural revolution. But on the whole, our work in developing and popularizing fine seed strains leaves much to be desired. According to an old peasant who is in his late sixties, wheat seeds sown to half of the cultivated area were handed down from their ancestors. These seeds were low in yield, and the old peasants called them "ancestors'" seeds. The reason why the per-unit-area yield of our late rice is the lowest in the city lies in the fact that the kind of crop that is still being grown here is a low-yield, unstable variety that is being discarded by other hsien. People called these seeds "ancient scholar's" seeds. Such "ancestors'" and "ancient scholar's" seeds still occupy about one-third of the total sown area. This goes to show how serious the problem is. On the other hand, however, it also shows that there is still great potential on the seed question. If only we work hard to develop and popularize good strains, it won't be too difficult to raise the per-unit-area yield by one or two hundred catties each quarter. The reason why we made so little progress in the field of seeds in the past was that we stuck to the old rules and established practices and depended on ready-made things in our work. The collective economy of the people's commune provides the most favorable conditions for developing and popularizing new seed strains, which the masses desire urgently. But favorable conditions do not function by themselves. It is for man to utilize and bring them into full play. If we free our minds from conservative ideas, make full use of these favorable conditions, adhere to the mass line and hold fast to the guiding line in seed work by "mainly depending on ourselves," and if the hsien, communes, brigades and production teams manage to set up and run well high-yield seed stations,

seed groups and seed fields at their separate levels, it will be possible to overcome output reduction or crop failure due to depending too much on others for seed strains instead of developing our own and to the lack of knowledge of a variety of seed strains we are using. In developing the mass scientific experimental activities on a larger scale, we must first foster and popularize, within 3-5 years, early-rice seed strains that can yield 1,200 catties per mow, late-rice and maize seed strains that can give a yield of a thousand catties per mow as well as barley, wheat and oat seed strains of 800-catty-per-mow yield. Looking further ahead, we should also begin to develop more advanced strains of the 1980's and 1990's. While grasping soil, water and seeds, we must enhance our efforts to accumulate more natural manure and step up plant protection and other work in order to implement the "Eight-Point Charter" on an overall scale. In this way, we are sure to achieve a new level in per-mow grain yield.

The fundamental way to continuously increase our capacity to struggle against nature and to quicken the reform of natural conditions so as to raise farm labor productivity is to bring about farm mechanization. As Chairman Mao pointed out in 1955: "Owing to the economic conditions of our country, the technical reform will take a longer time than the social reform. It is estimated that it will take about four to five Five-Year Plans, that is, twenty to twenty-five years, to basically complete technical reform in agriculture throughout the country. The whole Party must strive to accomplish this great task." Following Chairman Mao's instruction, the broad masses of poor and lower-middle peasants on the Ch'ungming Island, after 19 years of hard work, have basically realized mechanization or semi-mechanization of plowing and raking, drainage and irrigation, threshing, plant protection and processing of farm by-products. But the level of farm mechanization in the hsien is still below the requirements of agricultural development. On the average there is less than one large or medium tractor for each production brigade and only one hand-pulled tractor for three teams. Especially, manpower and machines prove inadequate during busy farm seasons when harvesting, planting, cultivation and capital construction work are carried out at the same time.

"When we had no farm machines, we longed for them. When there are farm machines around, we can't afford them." This is an outstanding problem faced by many communes and brigades in developing farm mechanization. Should we ask and wait for and depend on the state's help? Or should we persevere in relying on our own strength and resources? Actually, to "ask, wait and depend" is not only wrong but also unrealistic. Funds for farm mechanization should be raised mainly through the accumulation of the three-level collective economy of the people's commune. Now the average rate of communal accumulation of various production teams is about 10 percent. The average reserve fund retained by a team is approximately 1,600 yuan. With the increase of farm and subsidiary production, the rate of accumulation will continue to climb. But production increase and the practice of economy are a unity of opposites. "Economy is one of the basic principles underlying

socialist economy." Generally speaking, the present farm cost is higher than it should be. If this cost is lowered to 30 percent of the agricultural income, each production team can raise its annual accumulation by an average of over 600 yuan. If the cost is reduced to 25 percent, each team may more or less double its accumulation each year. According to the experience of some advanced communes and production teams, this can be achieved. When all production teams achieve this level of accumulation, they will be able to equip themselves with all the small agricultural machines they need within the next ten years. The thing is to run the commune industriously and thriftily, and to keep a well-balanced account of receipts and payments so as to be able to accumulate more year by year and eventually develop mechanization and capital construction with limited funds. The problem of procuring large and medium farm machines can also be solved through planned development of industry run by the commune and production brigade, and by strengthening the collective economy of the commune and brigade. This way, communes and brigades can give substantial aid to those production teams who need help the most. As funds accumulated by the commune- and brigade-industry of Paochen commune over the years have been basically used to aid agriculture and especially mechanization, the whole commune has managed to purchase more than one thousand machines of all kinds, over three times the sum total of machines bought in the 17 years before the cultural revolution. Following the development of farm mechanization, the commune's grain output in 1973 grew by 41 percent over 1965. What the Paochen commune has achieved other communes can achieve too. Besides industrial production, the workers and staff of the commune and brigade factories also take part in agricultural work during busy farming seasons, thus reinforcing manpower at the frontline of agricultural production and in no way increasing the state's outlay for commodity grain and wage funds. These factories should be developed in a planned and systematic way wherever possible so as to play a more effective role as a new force in farm mechanization.

Grain affects all sectors of the economy, so it must not be neglected. 'But things of the whole are not independent of the parts but are made up of the parts." In order to develop agriculture, particularly grain production, it is also necessary to energetically develop forestry, animal husbandry, sideline production and fishery, and to improve the climate for agricultural production, preserve soil and water, increase fertilizer and provide the funds. All these are needed for developing not only socialist agriculture but also for socialist industry and the national economy as a whole, and they also call for the supply of more commodity grain as well as other subsidiary farm products. Chairman Mao's policy of "promoting overall development of agriculture with primary emphasis on grain production" has pointed out the direction for us. By carrying out this policy through overall planning and proper arrangements, agriculture, forestry, sideline production and fishery will develop side by side and stimulate each other's growth.

We have all the objective conditions. The Ch'ungming Island not only has over 40,000 mow of surface of inland rivers for fish breeding, it also possesses great potential for developing fishery in the vast expanse of water in the Yangtse and surrounding seas. The long stretches of shoreline and large areas of new beaches provide big bases for afforestation. Full utilization of this vast natural world can be only achieved in a socialist society. Since the great proletarian cultural revolution, by relying on the collective economy of the people's communes and with grain as the key link, we have been vigorously developing forestry, cattle breeding, sideline production and **fish culture with considerable success. But we have** so far done relatively little in tapping the natural resources of the island. At present, the whole hsien has only about ten million trees in all, averaging less than twenty per person; in pig breeding, we have not reached the one-head-per-mow level; about 40 percent of the inland river surface suitable for **fish culture have not been used yet,** whereas the fish yield of those water bodies already in use is very low. In particular, because we have very few motor boats for fishing in the Yangtse and the sea, the output of aquatic products has been very low. At present a great gap exists between agriculture and other fields, especially **fish culture and forestry. This is something worth** thinking about **for an island which is the third largest in our country.** The main reason is that we have ignored the proportional relations between the various branches of the national economy; **this, in fact,** is due to our one-sidedness. Several years ago, we laid too much emphasis on the contradiction between developing grain production and the development of a diversified economy, and failed to recognize the interaction between them. Actually, failure to develop forestry, cattle breeding, sideline production or **fish culture affects the increase** of grain output both directly and indirectly. In the next ten years, apart from developing our pig breeding industry to the level of 1½ head per mow, we must also develop a diversified economy on **a full scale.** In particular, we must develop **fish culture and forestry on a larger scale** according to the characteristics of the island. In view of the backward state of our **fish culture, we should first of all fully mobilize** the broad masses to revolution**ize fish culture, with the collective** strength of all communes, brigades and teams put to work. Each commune is to set up a specialized fishing brigade, gradually mechanize all its fishing boats and modernize its fishing methods. There will be 400 pairs of sea-going trawlers and 500 river motor crafts. Every water body of inland rivers that can be used for breeding fish and growing aquatic crops should be utilized. The hsien's gross output of fish, shrimps, crabs, **and purple seaweeds in 1980 will be ten times the** current output, and by 1985 it will be 20 times. Moreover, we will develop the processing and cold storage of marine produce and turn Ch'ungming Island into one of Shanghai's fishing bases. In forestry, by relying on the strength of the hsien, communes, brigades and teams, we will afforest every area that is suitable for growing trees--along the dikes and river banks and alongside the roads. The state-owned forest farms, now covering over 4,000 mow of land, will be expanded to about 10,000 mow. At the same time, each and every family will be

urged to grow bamboo plants and trees around its house. By 1985, we will try to achieve basic self-sufficiency in timber, turning the island into a real "oasis" of the Yangtse River mouth. We will also exert our efforts in developing poultry, cattle and sheep breeding as well as apiculture and sericulture. Other sideline occupations include the planting of mushrooms, medicinal herbs, and weaving of willow-, straw- and reed-wares. Family side-occupations are to be encouraged in accordance with the Party's policies. As long as we strengthen leadership and achieve a diversified economy, nothing will hinder the development of grain production; on the contrary, we will surely enhance the growth of grain production.

In order to accelerate the development of agriculture and increase grain production, it is also necessary to develop local industries, communication and transportation, commerce, education and public health. This year, transplanting has been mechanized on one-third of the hsien's rice sown area. But to achieve overall mechanization of transplanting, a great many more rice-transplanters will be needed. Since this would sharpen the contradiction with seedling pulling by hand, it calls for trial manufacturing and popularization of such machines as pullers, rakers and ditch-diggers. All this will require great efforts in developing the farm machinery industry. But, at present, the hsien's farm machinery plants do not have enough equipment and motive power, and there is also an acute shortage of electric power. Adequate measures, therefore, should be taken to develop farm machinery and power industries. To develop **fish culture, we must also develop our ship-building industry.** And as steel is indispensable to industry, the iron and steel industry must be developed too. As Ch'ungming is an island, its sea-borne communications with Shanghai proper and other places are easily disrupted by storms. Thus it is even more important to increase its self-sufficiency in the means of production for farm uses. Of course, to develop all trades and professions relating to agriculture, we must first tap all the resources we have in respect to manpower, equipment and capital funds, raise our labor productivity, the rate of utilization of equipment and capital turnover. The policy is to "accomplish more with less money." There is great potential here. The problem of acquiring more manpower, equipment and funds should be solved mainly through tapping the resources of the three-level collective economy of the commune. In a word, we must carry out the basic policy of plain living and hard struggle and self-reliance. We must rely mainly on the revolutionary consciousness and strength of the people of Ch'ungming **in building a bright future for the island.**

Upon analyzing the hsien's natural resources and its potential for development of production, we strongly feel that it is entirely possible to continue to increase grain production in the next ten years at the same rate as in the past eight years. According to this rate, the average annual per-mow output will increase by about 100 catties, and by 1985 per-mow yield can reach as high as 2,200-2,400 catties across the hsien.

Chairman Mao says: "Revolution plus production can solve the food problem" and "revolution can change everything." Looking back over the history of the island for the last 25 years, we see this truth. In 1949, when the broad masses of the peasants were still bound hand and foot by the feudal relations of production, the annual grain yield per-mow of the hsien amounted to only a little over 230 catties. Subsequently, the land reform put an end to feudal production relations; by 1952 grain yield per-mow shot up to 518 catties, twice that of 1949. On the basis of cooperativization, the people's communes came into existence in 1958, further perfecting the socialist collective ownership of the working people, and grain production rose to 678 catties that year. But in the three years following 1959, the hsien suffered from Liu Shao-ch'i's revisionist line and unbridled capitalist tendencies, with grain yield dropping to 500 catties per mow. Then came the socialist education movement in the aftermath of the successful 10th Plenary Session of the 8th Party Central Committee. The vicious onslaught of the bourgeoisie was beaten back, the collective ownership of the people's communes was consolidated and developed, and production resumed its rapid growth. The 1964 grain per-mow yield surpassed the "Program" target, reaching 907 catties. Then the great proletarian cultural revolution smashed the two bourgeois headquarters of Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, and greatly galvanized the socialist initiative of the broad masses of the people. Grain output went up even further and reached the present level of more than 1,400 catties. The events over the past twenty-five years prove that firmly carrying out revolution according to the relatively correct line and policies has encouraged production, and that if we are misguided by the wrong line and fail to give prominence to revolution, production will suffer. This tells us that it is impossible to increase grain production by merely changing conditions of production, and that from now on we must emphasize revolutionary struggle, particularly that in the realm of the superstructure.

"Politics is the concentrated expression of economics." The socialist superstructure gives tremendous impetus to the development of socialist economy. But our superstructure is still imperfect, and the imperfect aspects will seriously hinder the development of our socialist economy. To guide the revolution in the realm of the superstructure with the viewpoint of one dividing into two is and always will be a basic guarantee of success in developing grain production in a big way. The great proletarian cultural revolution has brought great changes to the superstructure of Ch'ungming hsien, and this has played a great role in developing agricultural production and consolidating the collective economy of the people's commune. But can we say that the superstructure of the hsien is perfect now? We cannot say so. In the period 1971-1973, during the movement to criticize Lin Piao and rectify work style, the grain output of our hsien fluctuated--high in 1971, low in 1972 and high again in 1973. What caused the drop in 1972? The root cause is that the hsien Party committee relaxed its efforts in carrying out the Party basic line education and its attack against capitalist forces. To put it briefly, the committee relaxed

its efforts in the struggle between two classes, two roads and two lines. But while the grain output of the hsien as a whole declined in 1972, some communes like Ch'enchen commune increased their output by a big margin. Why? There were grave tendencies toward capitalism in four of Ch'enchen commune's production brigades. Thanks to the commune Party committee's effort in organizing the masses to drive back the capitalist onslaught, its grain production in 1972 rose by nearly one million catties, and the four brigades which originally showed capitalist tendencies increased their grain production by a total of 500,000 catties. Bad things can be turned into good things. By way of positive and negative lessons, these facts prove that "the correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything." Production can only be promoted through grasping revolution and firmly upholding Chairman Mao's revolutionary line. If we depart from Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and fail to guide the revolution in the realm of the superstructure with the one-into-two viewpoint, no plans, however excellent, can be realized. We should learn from the Hsiyang hsien Party committee for its revolutionizing the leading squads at the hsien, commune and brigade levels so as to firmly put power in the hands of the Marxists and poor and lower-middle peasants. Among the leading groups at various levels, the hsien Party committee is the key one. Our plans for developing agriculture will surely be realized if we build our hsien Party committee into a revolutionized and vigorous three-in-one leading group of the old, the middle-aged and the young, if we continue to develop the current movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius in a deeper, wider and protracted manner, if we strive to carry out well the revolution in the realm of the superstructure and revolutionize our style of work by going deeper down to the grassroots level, merging with the masses of the people and taking part in collective productive labor, and if we further develop the mass movement to learn from Tachai in agriculture. We must get hold of typical examples and use them to encourage and mobilize the broad masses of the people to go into action throughout the whole area.

Our long-range program has been formed through the struggle of the great proletarian cultural revolution and the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, and it can only be achieved through struggle. It would be purely wishful thinking if we thought that the outlook of Ch'ungming Island could be changed without undergoing arduous and tortuous struggles. However, "the wealth of society is created by the workers, peasants and the working intellectuals. As long as they take their destiny into their own hands, and as long as there is a Marxist-Leninist line and problems are not evaded but are tackled with a positive attitude, there is no difficulty in the world which cannot be overcome." Under the guidance of Chairman Mao's proletarian revolutionary line, the people of Ch'ungming Island can and will march onward from one victory to another in the midst of violent waves and storms!

* * *

The Slaves Are the Real Motive Force in the Making of History

- On the relations between pre-Ch'in slave uprisings and Confucian-Legalist struggle

by

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Vast numbers of the worker-peasant-soldier masses as well as revolutionary cadres and revolutionary intellectuals are now engaged in using the Marxist viewpoint to study in depth the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle in the past two thousand years and the history of class struggle as a whole. In this process studying the relationships between pre-Ch'in slave uprisings and the Confucian-Legalist struggle can help us deepen our understanding not only of the law of class struggle but also of the basic principle underlying the theory of historical materialism relating to the making of history by the slaves.

Marxism holds that only the class struggle of the masses of the people provides the real motive force propelling history forward. In the course of major social changes during which the feudal system replaced the slave system, only the class struggle of the slaves could be the decisive force for overcoming the slave system. In this social change during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods the Legalists struggled valiantly. Facts recorded in history have proved that the Confucian-Legalist struggle during this period was influenced and spurred on by the slave uprisings.

How did the pre-Ch'in Legalists mount the political stage? As the thinkers and political representatives of the newly rising landlord class, the Legalists at first appeared as opponents to the utterly reactionary and declining slave-owning nobles. However, the reactionary and decayed slave system would never of its own accord take leave of the historical stage. In this class struggle to uproot the decayed slave system, it was the resistance and struggles of the slaves themselves that had struck annihilating blows at the slave system. Since the slaves of the Shang Dynasty lighted the torch of revolutionary struggles in Muyeh, uprisings and disturbances had erupted in unending succession in succeeding generations. In the short span of 80 years from 550 B.C. to 470 B.C. altogether eight major slave uprisings and popular strivings had broken out. From slowdown to mass exodus and from minor disturbances to major armed rebellions, the struggles grew in size and became diverse in form. The massive uprising led by Liuhsia Chih in particular, with "a following numbering nine thousand," "overran the length and breadth of the empire and attacked the principalities." This massive uprising developed into

a mighty force that struck stunning blows -- politically, economically and ideologically -- at the dominance of the slave owners and struck fear among the slave-owning nobles. Rocked by the slave uprisings, states based on the slave system collapsed, their rulers dethroned and the "well-field" system abandoned. Scores of these major or minor resistance struggles by the slaves radically shook and broke the economic foundations of the slave system. By taking advantage of the favorable class struggle situation brought about by the slave uprisings that was in accord with the tide of the development of history, the Legalists who represented the interests of the newly rising landlord class were thus able to make their mark on the political stage.

The feudal system in the process of replacing the slave system was a revolution whereby one exploiting class was replaced by another. Although the newly rising landlord class was the leading class in this revolution, it was the slaves and other toiling people who from beginning to end played the role of the main force. The reason why the landlord class was in a position to play the leading role is that objectively the revolutionary cause of that class was supported by the slaves and other laboring people. Every forward step taken by the newly rising landlord class was in fact inseparable from the slaves' struggles. Shang Yang once made this clear and said, "Control over the empire must be preceded by control over the people." This meant that "control of the people" embodied the idea of organizing the people in accordance with the line and policies formulated by the landlord class. When Shang Yang introduced reforms in the state of Ch'in he recruited large numbers of the toiling people from the states of Han, Chao and Wei for land reclamation and farming in the state of Ch'in, making them part of the important force toward the implementation of the policies of agriculture and war in that state. When Ch'en Ch'eng-tzu of Ch'i was grabbing power from the slave-owning nobles he regulated and fixed the market prices of timber, fish and salt in order to win the support of the people inhabiting the cities. On the other hand, he made large tracts of private plots available to the vast numbers of fugitive slaves from other states. With these forces rallying around the Ch'en clan, Ch'en Ch'eng-tzu succeeded in seizing political power from the hands of the Ch'i ruler. This shows that the process of the landlord class seizing political power from the slave-owning class was one of fierce trial of strength between one class and another, that is, between the newly rising landlord class and the declining class. The main reason why the former was able to overcome the latter in terms of relative class strength is that the newly rising landlord class had the support of the slaves, that is, the masses of the people.

The triumph of the feudal system over the slave system covered a protracted historical period, with the struggle between restoration and counter-restoration having extended several hundred years. To prevent the slave owners from carrying out restoration, the landlord class had to exert efforts for several generations. But what provided the decisive force contributing to the eventual fulfillment of the historical task of completely defeating the restorationist forces of the slave owners was the slave uprisings and peasant revolts. The Chao Kao coup and restoration

amply proved that once the landlord class failed to obtain the support of the people and the slaves, it would have been impossible to accomplish independently the task of opposing the restoration of the slave owners. This is because they were engaged in a revolution whereby one exploiting system replaced another and the character of this revolution determined the fact that they neither could nor found it necessary to do such a thing as completely putting down a counter-revolution. Since a Legalist was after all a revolutionist of the exploiting class, once political power was grabbed he was quick to abandon the masses of the people who had supported the seizure of power. The disappearance of the popular force invariably made him feel isolated and weak. Thus when the restorationist forces of the slave owners became blatant and assertive, he began to reveal his inherent vulnerability and tendency toward compromise. To those slaves who had regained their freedom the Chao Kao coup meant no better than suffering hardships once again. As to the vast numbers of the people they would likewise face the danger of becoming slaves again. This determined the fact that the vast numbers of the toiling people constituted the most resolute and bravest revolutionary force against restoration. If it is said that Ch'in Shih Huang's unification of the six states represented the transition of the slave system to the feudal system, the peasant and slave uprisings at the end of the Ch'in period symbolized a decisive battle that had smashed the restoration of the slave system. This had played a decisive role in consolidating the newly emerging feudal system.

Why did the slaves and peasants associate themselves with the newly rising landlord class in opposing the slave-owning nobles in the big revolution whereby the feudal system replaced the slave system? This is because the relations of production based on the slave system had then completely decayed and declined. With the exception of the slave-owning class, all the other classes were hostile to the slave system and had pressed for reforms that would transform this type of production relations. Therefore, an alliance of these classes was forged on the common desire to uproot the slave system. However, because of the differing interests of the individual classes, the starting point of joining the revolution and the role each class was to play in the revolution differed. The progressive role of the Legalists in history mainly found expression in the gradual formulation of a correct line for resolving the principal contradictions in society in the course of constant practice, such as using the feudal system to supplant the slave system and using the dictatorship of the landlord class to supersede the dictatorship of the slave-owning class. This progressive role assumed by the Legalists may be attributed to the emergence of the landlord class as a representative of the new relations of production under the historical conditions which prevailed at the time, a factor identifying that class as a vigorous and real tiger, the only class which then was able to produce a political program and put forward its political views. However, it would have been impossible for the Legalists to assume this progressive role if they were divorced from the revolutionary struggles and practice of the vast numbers of the slaves who helped propel history forward. How did the Legalist political line come into being? In the final analysis it was in the main a reflection

of the social practice with the masses of people as the mainstay. Marx pointed out: "Mankind merely put forward those tasks they themselves could resolve because after careful pondering it has dawned on them that the tasks themselves will only come into being when the material conditions for their solution exist or at least are in the process of taking shape." Pre-Ch'in Legalists were in a position to advance a correct line capable of resolving the principal contradictions in society primarily because social practice at the time had created the material conditions. For instance, the Legalists proposed the abolition of the "well-field" system because the fleeing slaves, their uprisings and disturbances had already signified a struggle against the slave-owning nobles, one betwen abolition of the "well-field" system and its restoration. The Legalists proposed "following the examples of later kings" because the slaves had already smashed the domination of the slave-owning "early kings" and because there was a revolutionary precedent in which Liuhsia Chih, a slave leader, had severely denounced Confucius' reactionary teachings of "following the examples of early kings." The Legalists favored views frowning upon the "Heavenly mandate" because the slaves had used their own revolutionary practice to pronounce the bankruptcy of the theory of "Heavenly mandate." All this explains that the revolutionary struggles and practice of the slaves determined whether or not the Legalist line could be put into practice. Similarly, the revolutionary struggles and practice of the slaves to a very large extent had influenced the shaping of Legalist ideas. It was therefore natural for the social practice at that time to be stamped with the brand of the landlord class and became the latter's own ideological and political line and theoretical basis once it was reflected to the minds of the Legalists.

Judging from the process of the coming into being of the Legalist ideological and political line to its acceptance, the progressive role of the Legalists was inseparable from the struggles and practice of the slaves in the making of history. Of course, the ideological and political line proposed by the pre-Ch'in Legalists had contributed to the transition of the slave system to the feudal system, it in no way could supplant the role of the masses of the people as a motive force propelling history forward. In the last analysis, the history of the feudal system having replaced the slave system is not the history of a number of Legalist representatives swaying the situation. Rather, it is the revolutionary struggles of the slaves that determined the revolutionary role of the newly rising landlord class.

"The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history." In studying the pre-Ch'in Confucian-Legalist struggle we must place it in a given historical environment of class struggle and examine it. Under the promise of affirming the role of the slaves in propelling history forward, we should give the progressive role of the Legalists the necessary historical affirmation. This serves as a penetrating repudiation of the fallacy preached by Lin Piao that "Heroes and slaves jointly make history." Only by doing so can we come up with a scientific explanation and correct theoretical interpretations in the

study of the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle. And only thus can we sum up the historical experience of the two-line struggle and serve the needs of consolidating proletarian dictatorship.

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Comment on the Image of Kuan Yü on the Old Opera Stage

by

Yün Lan (云岚)

(Hsüeh-hsi yü P'i-p'an [Study and Criticisism], No. 11, November 20, 1974)

Kuan Yü* was portrayed on the old opera stage as a "divine" idol, an image permeated with the reactionary Confucian political ideal and moral code. For a long time the Kuan Yü image had dominated the stage with pomp and ostentation. After the new China was established the Kuan Yü opera, in one revised script after another, continued to be presented throughout the country to spread its pernicious influence, under the protection and connivance of the counter-revolutionary revisionist sinister line in literature and art. Dissecting the Kuan Yü image, therefore, would be most helpful to our study of the history of the Confucian-Legalist struggle, repudiation of revere-Confucianism and oppose-Legalism ideas pervading the old opera and elimination of the pernicious influence of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius.

I

Kuan Yü of the old opera stage was portrayed as a paragon of virtue, a person of "divine prowess" and "wide learning." One line in verse extolled his "lofty sense of righteousness," an attribute he had acquired because he was versed in the Spring and Autumn Annals. All this added up to the Kuan Yü image.

On stage Kuan Yü was glorified as a person of commanding demeanor -- his weather-beaten countenance and flowing beard, his slant eyes and thick eyebrows -- conveying the impression of his importance. Riding on a thoroughbred and holding a long and massive saber, he was clad in armor and was ready to fight at the slightest provocation. His acting called for particularly demanding emphasis and tended to merge the sterling qualities of other key actors into something that would bring out the salient features of a prominent actor. On stage he was required to strike altogether 48 postures, based on the sculptured figures placed at the Kuan Ti Shrine and 24 sets of pictures depicting "Kuan Kung." This was beyond the reach of any stage figure in any old opera. In the old society before an opera featuring Kuan Yü was staged, the actor portraying Kuan Yü was required by feudal convention and superstition to abstain from some kinds of food, sleep alone and clean his body, apart from going through the ritual of burning joss sticks and kowtowing before a portrait of Kuan Yü. After the performance, the particular performer was required to wipe his face with a piece of yellowish paper and burn it before the portrait of Kuan Yü, with kowtowing and mutterings of gratitude. During a performance of Retreat to Maicheng incense was burned and candles were lit both on and below the stage, with smoke blanketing the whole place and resembling a Taoist ritual invoking the immortals.

* Kuan Yü (关羽), commonly known as Kuan Kung, is a heroic character in the novel "Romance of the Three Kingdoms," reputed to have immense prowess and moral justice. - translator

In history, actually, Kuan Yü did not amount to much. His position was no better than that of Chang Fei, Ma Chao, Huang Chung and Chao Yun. He was a native of the east side of the river (in what is now Yungchi hsien, Shansi), according to chronicles entered in Ch'en Shou's Records of the Three Kingdoms and Pei Sung-chih's Annotations to Records of the Three Kingdoms." In his early years he wandered about and fled to Chuchun (in what is now Chu hsien in Hopei) where he joined Liu Pei. When Ts'ao Ts'ao led his men to attack Liu Pei in 200 A.D., Kuan Yü was defeated and captured by Ts'ao Ts'ao who accepted his surrender and conferred on him the title of marquis. Not long afterward, however, he fled again to join Liu Pei. The latter in 207 adopted the Legalist line and policies formulated by Chuko Liang. With the tide turning, Liu Pei was thus able to whip up a political force to match those of Ts'ao Ts'ao and Sun Ch'üan. In this process Kuan Yü, under the leadership of Liu Pei and Chuko Liang, won a number of battles. However, he began to rest on his laurels and became overbearing. Particularly when Liu Pei and Chuko Liang entrusted him with the heavy responsibility of holding Chingchow before proceeding westward to Yichow, his head swelled to the point of undermining the correct "Wu-Shu alliance" line pursued by Liu Pei and Chuko Liang. This resulted in the loss of the strategic stronghold of Chingchow and the loss of his own life too. The loss of Chingchow and the resounding defeat in the battle of Yiling three years later had so weakened the state of Shu that the kingdom had to confine itself to the southwest sector. This shows that Kuan Yü was not an invincible general of "divine prowess" but rather one who had frequently erred politically and militarily. As to the allegation that he was an "upright man" with a "lofty sense of righteousness," it did not accord with facts. For instance, when Ts'ao Ts'ao and Liu Pei joined forces at Hsiapei to attack Lü Pu in 198, the latter sent Ch'in I-lu to Yuan Shu to ask for help. Taking advantage of other people's plight, Kuan Yü on several occasions had approached Ts'ao Ts'ao to do him a favor so he could covet Ch'in's wife. This served to lay bare the soul of what was called an upright man.

Transforming an ordinary person in history into a divine figure on stage with unmatched prowess involved a course of development.

According to historical records, legends and portraits about "Kuan Kung making his haloed appearances" were circulated during the Sui and T'ang and the Five Dynasties. However, Kuan Yü's political status began to rise and his artistic image began to emerge only after the Sung and Yuan dynasties. During the reign of Hui-tsung of Northern Sung and the emperor's addiction to communicating with supernatural beings and powers, Kuan Yü for the first time was associated with divinity and given princely titles such as "Prince Wu-an" and "Upright and Brave Prince Wu-an." After the House of Sung moved to the south both Kao-tsung and Hsiao-tsung conferred additional exalted titles on Kuan Yü. In these circumstances sections of Records of the Three Kingdoms dealing with Kuan Yü began to take on narrative and other forms, such as ballads or adaptations for literary and art programs. During the Yuan Dynasty Mongolian nobles continued to extol Kuan Yü, with Emperor Wen-tsung conferring more impressive titles on him and decreeing sacrificial offerings in his honor.

This was followed by the presentation of local operas with Kuan Yü as the hero. The projection of the Kuan Yü image attained near perfection at the end of the Yuan and the advent of the Ming when Romance of the Three Kingdoms, a book-length novel manifesting serious tendencies toward revering Confucianism and opposing Legalism and having absorbed previous myths and legends, was published. After the Ming period the reactionary ruling classes spared no efforts to applaud Kuan Yü, with some people depicting him as "the first marvel of bravery among famous generals in ancient times." Emperor Shen-tsung of Ming conferred on Kuan Yü the title of "exalted emperor." This was the first time that Kuan Yü was given the exalted appellation. During the reign of Emperor Tao-kuang of Ch'ing, additional titles were conferred on Kuan Yü on four separate occasions, with one lengthy title containing 14 characters. Temples were set up everywhere as a tribute to him. In shrines placed in the Ch'ing imperial palace, he could be seen wearing the imperial headgear and enjoying the same solemn ritual accorded to Confucius. With Kuan Yü's ascent in political status, more and more stage performances deifying his image were presented. During the reign of Emperor Ch'ien-lung, the imperial household systematically compiled and catalogued a repertoire of altogether 239 performances derived and adapted from the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, with the character Kuan Yü predominating and on a scale never before witnessed. With the advent of Peking opera in the mid-Ch'ing period, at least 27 performances out of a total of 155 San Kuo (三國) plays were about Kuan Yü. Lu Hsün said, "Confucius' luck, I may say, turned after his death because then he could no longer nag. People in power dressed him up with white powder until he was elevated to frightening proportions." Quite by coincidence Kuan Yü's likewise was in good fortune after his death. Perhaps he never dreamed of rising to become emperor, to be in an exalted position and to be on stage to preach to the public. The Kuan Yü image on the old opera stage was wholly conceived by the feudal rulers on the basis of their own political needs.

II

The elevation of Kuan Yü's political status and the shaping and development of his artistic image had their deep historical and class roots.

China's feudal society was on the decline after the Sung and Yuan periods, this being the social basis for the forming and development of the Kuan Yü image. The rise of Kuan Yü's position and the decline of feudal society, an occurrence lacking proportion, was an inevitable reflection of class struggle in the course of the development of history.

The ever increasing intensification of contradictions between the landlord class and the peasantry had prevailed from the Sung and Yuan to the Ming and Ch'ing. In the face of the smoldering conflagration of peasant uprisings the feudal rulers realized that resorting to brutal suppression was not enough. What they needed was a more sinister and ruthless approach, that is, "revering Confucianism and attaching importance to moral instruction," implying the strengthening of the landlord class dictatorship in the ideological sphere and the use of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius to

enfetter the people's minds. They were utterly stubborn reactionaries, being strongly averse to any insignificant change and reform. In their view, only by observing the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and strictly following the three bonds and five constant virtues could they find the way out. All this explains why ideas revering Confucianism and opposing Legalism had spread unchecked since the Sung and Yuan periods. It was exactly under such a class struggle situation that the Kuan Yü image came to the fore. If it is said that Confucius was the apologist for the declining slave system, then Kuan Yü was the guardian when the feudal system was on the decline. The two "sages" in fact complemented each other in their respective fields of excellence, erudition and proficiency in the martial arts.

A black thread running through the Kuan Yü image implied that he was "well versed in the Spring and Autumn Annals, duly observed admonitions handed down by the ancients and put the three bonds and five constant virtues in their proper order."

By scanning the repertoire dealing with Kuan Yü, one would often come upon scenes and lines depicting Kuan Yü reading the Spring and Autumn Annals (hereafter Annals). He would attribute his victorious battles to the Annals and refer to the Annals whenever he was defeated on the battlefield. He would also cite sections from the Annals when he was reviewing his troops or showing them his way of swordsmanship. He in fact exemplified one who always held the Annals in his hand and never opened his mouth without quoting the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius.

The Annals chronicles what Confucius observed as a spokesman for the declining slave-owning nobility. It embodies "restraining oneself and returning to propriety" as its thesis in a futile attempt to restore the slave system. The old operas spared no efforts to demonstrate that the Annals provided Kuan Yü with the criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and for guiding his actions, the spiritual prop sustaining his outlook on life and code of behavior. He was "well versed in the Annals" for the purpose of "duly abiding by the admonitions handed down from the ancients" and "putting the three bonds and five constant virtues in their proper order." He depended on the Annals to "pacify disorder and rebellion." In other words, he wanted to put down peasant revolution, oppose the reformists, uphold the old system and turn back the wheel of history.

In the old opera Kuan Yü was endowed with traits identified with "loyalty," "righteousness" and "valor." This exemplified his devotion to the Annals and his dedication to rolling the wheel of history back.

The qualities of "loyalty," "righteousness" and "valor" found embodiment in Kuan Yü, complete with distinctive class content.

The opera Peach Garden Sworn Brotherhood was based on the fictitious narrative about Kuan Yü, Chang Fei and Liu Pei entering into a political alliance with the avowed purpose of "bolstering the enduring cause of the House of Han." It depicted an epoch of great social upheaval during the

latter period of the Eastern Han. The peasant uprising represented by the Yellow Turban Army struck stunning blows at the reactionary and decayed Eastern Han imperial court. This accelerated the disintegration and collapse of the feudal ruling classes from within. The opera used this as a backdrop to describe Kuan Yü's meeting with Liu Pei and Chang Fei in a wayside tavern. Why did the trio, not having been acquainted with each other before, fall in with each other the moment they had met? This was occasioned by their common class basis and their common political objective. The three all claimed they were upholding the interests of the landlord class. Politically, their entering into "sworn brotherhood" was aimed at putting down peasant uprisings. They were bitter about the Yellow Turbans, denouncing them as "bandits" and "thieves" -- the cause of "desolation across the land and fighting everywhere." The first thing they did after they had entered into "sworn brotherhood" was to forge weapons and recruit followers. An armed landlord class force was quickly formed to pounce at the peasant insurgents. Chang Pao, leader of the Yellow Turban Army, for instance, was hacked to death by Kuan Yü's butcher knife. The "Peach Garden sworn brotherhood" was also aimed at setting up an example within the reactionary ruling class so all would rally around the same banner and "pool" their efforts to "support" and "bring succor" to the imperial court. What they insisted on bringing "succor" to was nothing but the Eastern Han feudal dynasty which was then on the verge of collapse. This was no different from "reviving the states that have been extinguished." They were also out to "assuage" the populace comprising none other than the apprehensive and worried landowners who had suffered from the heavy blows struck by the raging peasant uprisings. In other words, this was no different from "restoring families whose line of succession has been broken and calling to office those who have fallen into obscurity." This clearly shows that the virtues of "loyalty" and "righteousness" disseminated in the opera were conceived to oppose peasant uprisings and uphold feudal rule and to serve the needs of "reviving the states that have been extinguished, restoring families whose line of succession has been broken and calling to office those who have fallen into obscurity."

Kuan Yü's superior "valor" was glorified in operas depicting his numerous battles with the opposition forces. In battle scenes portrayed in the old opera his massive saber was either directed at the peasant insurgents or "treacherous ministers" who sought to "usurp the throne." This illustrates that his "valor" served nothing more than the political aim of "maintaining the House of Han." This "valor" which presupposes "loyalty" and "righteousness" as the prerequisite was particularly favored by the reactionary ruling classes.

In the old opera Kuan Yü's "loyalty," "righteousness" and "valor" were all attributed to the "will of Heaven," indicating that what he had done in his time was preordained by "Heaven" and making the Kuan Yü image in full accord with the Confucian ideal. In one opera depicting Kuan Yü's impressive and unique demeanor as symbolizing the virtues of "loyalty," "righteousness" and "valor," the hand of Goddess Kuan Yin in changing his "look" was unmistakable. In another opera the myth surrounding the origin

of Kuan Yü's "divine saber" was recapitulated to convey the impression that the saber was forged under unusual circumstances to make it a particularly lethal weapon. Kuan Yü's swordsmanship, expressed in 64 steps, was also derived from Heaven. In fact, everything that Kuan Yü could do or excel was preordained by Heaven. In another version of the San Kuo dealing with opera, Kuan Yü's consistent devotion to the practice of "loyalty" and "righteousness" was rewarded with his "ascent into Heaven" after his death along with all "loyal ministers and upright men." This attempt to identify "loyalty" and "righteousness" with the "will of Heaven" did achieve the purpose of sanctifying such reactionary ideas as the three bonds and five constant virtues as well as the "divine right of kings" advocated by the feudal ruling classes.

Confucius' advocacy of the practice of "loyalty," "righteousness" and "valor" when referring to the relations between the "prince and his ministers," the "superior man" and the "benevolent" was in line with the ideology and moral code of the reactionary declining classes. In this sense the Kuan Yü image embodied this reactionary concept, a moral concept exemplified in Kuan Yü, an elaborately conceived artistic type, and used by the feudal ruling classes to maintain their rule.

"Morality from beginning to end is class morality." In class society each class has its moral principles and rules of conduct that vary with individual conditions and individual concepts of right and wrong. In the eyes of the working people, the much vaunted moral principles of Kuan Yü -- embodying "loyalty," "righteousness" and "valor" -- mean nothing more than counter-revolutionary stubbornness, viciousness and ruthlessness. In the old opera Kuan Yü pledged allegiance to the feudal ruling classes only to end up in his own decapitation and loss of life. The laurel he wore was stained with the blood of the revolutionary peasants and tainted with the resentment of the laboring people. Kuan Yü's "loyalty," "righteousness" and "valor," therefore, were no better than the servitude of hangmen.

Applauding the dead souls in history is aimed at serving the needs of actual struggles. The reason why the feudal ruling classes after the Sung and Yuan periods wanted to idolize Kuan Yü is to save the rapidly disintegrating and collapsing feudal system. Kuan Yü's long draw on stage signaled the despair and groan of the landlord class before its demise. The political implication of elevating Kuan Yü was nowhere more explicit than a line taken from one of the operas included in the imperial San Kuo repertoire which exhorted the audience to venerate the ruler and love their superiors. The feudal landlord class used the Kuan Yü image to oppose peasant revolutions and combat change. By invoking the Kuan Yü image they tried to cover up their hideous features and misdeeds with the veil of "morality" so as to benumb and poison the people. The message given was clear: all must subordinate themselves to feudal rule and willingly serve the landlord class like faithful slaves. For more than 800 years every additional "halo" over Kuan Yü's head meant more spiritual fetters for the working people. However, history is inexorable. The determination of revolutionary peasants to smash the landlord class state

machine and the spiritual yoke imposed on the people in no way could be overcome. Neither Confucius' Annals nor Kuan Yü's big saber could stop the rolling wheel of history propelled by the laboring people.

III

After examining the Kuan Yü image we are able to see more clearly that the struggle between the two classes and the two lines in literature and art invariably involves the basic question of typifying the heroes of which class.

In class society "all culture or literature and art belong to a particular class and serve a particular political line." Any class seeking to dominate the literary and art stage and make drama serve its politics must use every conceivable means to portray its own heroes. There is no exception to this rule in ancient and modern times, in China or elsewhere. Imagine how the feudal landlord class went to great lengths in conceiving the Kuan Yü image. In detailing the plot they created something out of nothing, transplanted one thing to another, kept evils under wraps but applauded "worthy deeds," not hesitating to distort and tamper with history, glorifying the characterization and dramatization of the principal character with elaborate care. In order to set off the "towering" Kuan Yü image to advantage, they did their best to vilify the laboring people and Legalist representatives. Kuan Yü's red face symbolizing "loyalty" was contrasted with Ts'ao Ts'ao's white face denoting "treachery," with the former's commanding presence completely overshadowing the latter's villainy and awkwardness. As to the peasant heroes like Chang Chueh, Chang Pao and Chang Liang, they were abused and presented in such a bad light that their heroic features were almost unrecognizable. In molding the Kuan Yü image the feudal landlord class had labored for several hundred years, indicating their tenacious adherence to the reactionary class stand.

The distinction between the revolutionary literature and art of the proletariat and the literature and art of the feudal landlord class and all exploiting classes lies not in the portrayal of heroes, but in the portrayal of such heroes that fit in with given political and artistic criteria and given world outlook. Equipping the worker-peasant-soldier heroes with the proletarian world outlook is the fundamental task of the socialist literary and art workers. This is the watershed between our literature and art and those of all the exploiting classes, the focal point of struggle on the question of literature and art between ourselves and opportunist chieftains within the Party. Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao and their agents in literary and art circles are Confucian devotees. They have never objected to using the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and reactionary revisionist ideas to mold types that are in accord with the ideals of the landlord and bourgeois classes. However, they are opposed to the use of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought to project the towering and perfect images of proletarian heroes from among the workers, peasants and soldiers. Hasn't this struggle shockingly unfolded itself before us in the past 25 years since our state was established? All the theories advanced such as those advocating "truthful writing," "the broad

road of realism," "deepening realism" and those opposing "selected themes" and "powder smell" and so on have all been opposed to the portrayal of proletarian heroes and the exercise of proletarian dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the sphere of literature and art. Under the connivance of the revisionist line in literature and art, characters like Kuan Yü mounted the stage and "honest officials" like Hai Jui and Li Hui Niang broke loose. Upon seeing the murky atmosphere blanketing the socialist stage, the bourgeois careerist, conspirator and double-dealer Lin Piao was so elated that he cried: "The question of orientation has been settled." He openly called for "learning" from the literature and art of the landlord and bourgeois classes so as to "assimilate its essence." How blatant this counter-revolutionary was then.

With the perverted practice of people like Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao in mind, great leader Chairman Mao incisively pointed out: "How strange this is for so many Communists to be keen about promoting feudal and bourgeois art instead of promoting socialist art." Under the command of Chairman Mao, the proletariat began to attack the old Peking opera, a most stubborn citadel, and all feudal, capitalist and revisionist literature and art. They penetratingly repudiated the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and shattered the interference and sabotage of the two bourgeois headquarters commanded by Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, thereby winning a great victory in the proletarian revolution in literature and art. After the emperors, kings, generals, ministers, scholars and beauties were expelled from the stage, worker-peasant-soldier heroes gleaming with the radiance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung thought have dominated the stage. Looking back at this battle in which centuries-old history that was reversed by the exploiting classes had again been reversed, we have deeply realized that domination by proletarian heroes of the stage does not simply mean a change of characters. Rather, it implies the use of Marxism to defeat revisionism and combat the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, substituting proletarian dictatorship for bourgeois dictatorship. This inevitably calls for a violent struggle between the two classes and the two lines.

Marx pointed out: "Old things invariably seek to restore and consolidate themselves in a nascent form." As long as class struggle rages, the strivings on the literary and art stage will not subside. The further the socialist revolution advances, the more penetrating the repudiation of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and ideas revering Confucianism and opposing Legalism in the superstructure becomes. The class enemies at home and abroad will certainly hit back in a frenzy. This is an objective law independent of man's will. Although characters like Kuan Yü have been expelled from the stage, this does not mean that the pernicious influence of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius in the theater has been eliminated. Once the opportunity presents itself, characters like Kuan Yü would mount the stage in disguise. The Chiang Kai-shek clique entrenched in Taiwan has written a television drama based on Kuan Yü's "great exploits" for the purpose of carrying forward the "spirit of loyalty, righteousness, benevolence and valor" of "Kuan Kung." Not to be outdone by Taiwan, the Soviet revisionist renegade clique staged in Moscow a farce applauding

Confucius and broadcasting the threadbare tunes of the old Peking opera to praise people like Kuan Yü. Proceeding from the plane of consolidating proletarian dictatorship and preventing capitalist restoration, we must recognize the great significance of portraying proletarian heroes, completely repudiating ideas spread in the old opera of revering Confucianism and opposing Legalism and thoroughly discrediting the revisionist line in literature and art. We must seriously study the creative experience of model revolutionary stage productions and carry on unremittingly struggles to portray more towering and perfect images of proletarian heroes.

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